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Regulatory Bundling 
abstract.  Regulatory bundling is the aggregation or disaggregation of legislative rules by 
administrative agencies. Agencies, in other words, can bundle what would otherwise be multiple 
rules into just one rulemaking. Conversely, they can split one rule into several. This observation 
parallels other recent work on how agencies can aggregate adjudications and enforcement actions 
but now focuses on legislative rules, the most consequential form of agency action. The topic is 
timely in light of a recent executive order directing agencies to repeal two regulations for every 
new one promulgated. Agencies now have a greater incentive to pack regulatory provisions to-
gether for every two rules they can repeal. 
 This Article explores the positive determinants and normative implications of regulatory bun-
dling and unbundling. The empirical analysis reveals that agencies have been increasingly engag-
ing in regulatory bundling for the last two decades. More generally, bundling behavior varies 
widely across different administrative agencies, and agencies appear to include more subjects in 
their final—as opposed to proposed—rules. These findings, in turn, raise significant normative 
concerns that could be addressed through a suite of tools novel to the administrative state: single-
subject rules, line-item vetoes, and innovative uses of more traditional doctrines of judicial review. 
Whether some of these tools should be adopted, however, requires further empirical assessment 
of regulatory bundling’s causes and consequences. 
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introduction 
Administrative agencies can make policy in myriad ways. They can, for ex-
ample, choose their form of action: whether a rule, an adjudication, an enforce-
ment, or a guidance document.
1
 For decades, commenters have analyzed the 
positive and normative trade-offs of each.
2
 More recently, scholars have become 
attentive to the ways in which these forms can be aggregated. Some have debated 
adjudicatory aggregation through administrative class actions.
3
 Others have re-
marked upon “crackdowns,” or the ways in which enforcement actions can be 
pursued all at once.
4
 This lens has shed new light on agency discretion by draw-
ing upon rich analogies to other areas of the law, such as civil procedure, where 
aggregation and its discontents are common themes.
5
 
Puzzling, then, that more attention has not been paid to the ways in which 
agencies can aggregate perhaps the most consequential tool at their disposal: 
legislative rules.
6
 Like statutes, legislative rules bind entire classes of individu-
 
1. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1384 
(2004) (noting that a “legislative rule, administrative adjudication, judicial enforcement, or 
guidance” document usually comprises the “standard set” of agency policy-making forms). 
2. See, e.g., id. at 1396-97; Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The 
Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 272-73 (1987); Glen O. Robinson, The Mak-
ing of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative 
Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 512 (1970); David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemak-
ing or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965). 
3. See, e.g., Shannon M. Grammel & Joshua C. Macey, The Costs of Aggregating Administrative 
Claims, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 123 (2018); Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, 
The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 1999 (2012) (arguing “that agencies should 
adopt aggregation procedures, like a civil class action, to resolve common claims raised by 
large groups of people in administrative courts”); Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zim-
merman, Inside the Agency Class Action, 126 YALE L.J. 1634 (2017). 
4. See, e.g., Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31, 33 (2017) (defining a “crackdown” as 
“an executive decision to intensify the severity of enforcement of existing regulations or laws 
as to a selected class of offenders or a selected set of offenses”); Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: 
The Emerging “Drug Exception” to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889, 894 (1987) (describ-
ing an “extraordinary enforcement program” against drugs that “set new records in every cat-
egory of measurement—drug seizures, investigations, indictments, arrests, convictions, and 
asset forfeitures”). 
5. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183. 
6. To be sure, the legal literature has recognized that rules can be bundled and split, but has not 
given the topic sustained attention. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Daniel E. Walters, Agenda-
Setting in the Regulatory State: Theory and Evidence, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 865, 876 (2016) (ob-
serving that some “statutes give greater discretion to agencies to pace their progress in imple-
menting bundles of rules by simply requiring the agency to finish all of its rulemaking re-





 And they too can be combined in multiple ways—a phenomenon that we 
refer to as regulatory bundling. Regulatory bundling refers to the ability of an 
agency to choose the scope of a single rulemaking—the number of discrete issues 
to resolve at a given point in time. Bundling decisions can occur at all stages of 
the rulemaking process, from drafting to implementation to litigation. For ex-
ample, an agency can bundle some decisions at the proposed rule stage, only to 
split them into distinct final rules. It can then reaggregate those issues and revise 
them through a subsequent regulation. 
Consider some examples: 
   The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently issued a proposed 
rule which, in the Agency’s own words, combined “three distinct ac-
tions.”
8
 Some of these had previously been issued separately, but were 
now combined into one proposed rule. The rule’s most high-profile ac-
tion revised the Agency’s Clean Power Plan, which was an effort by the 
Obama Administration to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from coal-
burning power plants.
9
 In addition, the rule proposed new requirements 
regarding state implementation of the new emissions requirements. Fi-
nally, the rule revised the Agency’s New Source Review program, a pre-
construction air permitting requirement. Some commented that the 
Clean Power Plan revisions were actually “distractions” from the more 




Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1792 (2013); Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 994, 
995 n.12 (2011) (noting the possibility that agencies split rules into parts to avoid review by 
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs). Relatedly, Abbe Gluck, Anne O’Connell, 
and Rosa Po remark upon what they call “omnibus rules.” Omnibus rules can be understood 
as a subset of the larger category of what we call bundled rules, which includes rules with 
unrelated and related provisions. Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unor-
thodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789 (2015). 
7. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Rules—Interpretative, Legislative, and Retroactive, 57 
YALE L.J. 919, 919 (1948) (noting that “rule-making is the part of the administrative process 
that resembles a legislature’s enactment of a statute”). 
8. Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating 
Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Implementing Regulations; Revisions to New Source 
Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44746 (proposed Aug. 31, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 51, 52, 60). 
9. The Clean Power Plan was issued as a final rule in October 2015. See Carbon Pollution Emis-
sion Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 64662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
10. See, e.g., @AriPeskoe, TWITTER (Aug. 21, 2018, 12:19 PM), https://twitter.com/AriPeskoe
/status/1031984028948328448 [https://perma.cc/Z2JL-PMVK]. 
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   Years earlier, EPA had initially set out to regulate greenhouse gases under 
the Clean Air Act through one rulemaking.
11
 After a change in presiden-
tial administration, however, the Agency instead decided to issue four 
separate rules addressing different subjects.
12
 The first determined that 
carbon dioxide “endangered” the public.
13
 The second regulated auto 
emissions in light of that finding.
14
 The third dealt with “triggered” per-
mitting requirements for stationary sources,
15
 while the fourth “tai-
lor[ed]” the permitting requirements to the largest carbon emissions 
sources.
16
 All of these regulatory decisions could have been packaged 
into one rulemaking, but EPA chose to split them into four.
17
 
   The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) tradition-
ally regulated a single substance at a time.
18
 Its Air Contaminants Stand-
ard rule, however, addressed 428 substances—from sulfur dioxide, to 
styrene, to wood and grain dust—all at once.
19
 After a court struck down 
the bundled regulation, OSHA was unable to revise any of the individual 




11. See Gluck, O’Connell & Po, supra note 6, at 1806; Michael S. Greve & Ashley C. Parrish, Ad-
ministrative Law Without Congress, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 501, 507 (2015). 
12. Greve & Parrish, supra note 11, at 507. 
13. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496, 66524 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. ch. 1). 
14. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Econ-
omy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 
85, 86, 600; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536-538). 
15. Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean 
Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17004 (Apr. 2, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 50, 51, 70, 71). 
16. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 31514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71). 
17. Greve & Parrish, supra note 11, at 507. 
18. See AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 971 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that “[u]nlike most of the 
OSHA standards previously reviewed by the courts, the Air Contaminants Standard regulates 
not a single toxic substance, but 428 different substances”). 
19. See id.; Air Contaminants, 54 Fed. Reg. 2332 (Jan. 19, 1989) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 
1910). 
20. See John Howard, OSHA Standards-Setting: Past Glory, Present Reality and Future Hope, 14 EMP. 
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 237, 250 (2010) (noting that since the adverse court decision, “OSHA has 
been unable to reestablish new [standards] for the substances covered in its former air con-
taminants” rule, despite efforts to issue a new rule covering twenty substances). 
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   In response to patient deaths in fialuridine clinical trials, the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) proposed a rule establishing new reporting 
requirements for human drug and biological products as well as investi-
gational new drug applications.
21
 It delayed the issuance of the final rule 
in response to heavy criticism from commenters, however, and consid-
ered breaking up the proposed rules into three separate final rules.
22
 The 




Each of these scenarios illustrates a form of bureaucratic discretion that we 
call regulatory bundling—a practice with underexplored implications for the ad-
ministrative state. 
Indeed, the phenomenon has newfound significance after a recent Trump 
Administration executive order aimed at reducing regulatory costs.
24
 The order 
contains, among other things, a “two-for-one” requirement, which directs agen-
cies to repeal two regulations for every significant new one promulgated.
25
 Ex-
ecutive agencies now have a greater incentive to pack more regulatory provisions 
into one rule because doing so delivers more bang for the buck. Assuming a fixed 
amount of offsetting rules at a given time, an agency can regulate more by ag-
gregating more provisions into a single rulemaking.
26
 If, by contrast, the agency 
splits the provisions, it would be forced to find two additional rules to repeal. 
One would thus expect to see more regulatory bundling after the executive order 
went into effect. 
 
21. Adverse Experience Reporting Requirements for Human Drug and Licensed Biological Prod-
ucts, 59 Fed. Reg. 54046 (proposed Oct. 27, 1994) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 20, 310, 312, 
314, 600); see FDA Defers to International Harmonization in Adverse Event Reporting Proposal, 
GUIDE TO GOOD CLINICAL PRAC. NEWSL., Dec. 1995, at 6. 
22. FDA Defers to International Harmonization in Adverse Event Reporting Proposal, supra note 21. 
23. See Expedited Safety Reporting Requirements for Human Drug and Biological Products, 62 
Fed. Reg. 52237, 52238 (Oct. 7, 1997) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 20, 310, 312, 314, 600) 
(“[The FDA] has decided to withdraw the proposed amendments to the [Investigational New 
Drug] requirements for clinical study design and conduct and annual sponsor reporting. The 
agency will, instead, develop a guidance document providing recommendations on study de-
sign and monitoring of investigational drugs used to treat serious and potentially fatal ill-
nesses.”). 
24. Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017). 
25. Id. 
26. There is, of course, an important dynamic element depending on the relevant time horizons. 
Given a finite store of minor regulations sacrificed to be part of the two regulations repealed, 
in the long run, agencies will have to sacrifice their bundled regulations in order to issue a 
new regulation. In this manner, bundling rules in response to the executive order could back-
fire. 
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As further motivation, consider parallel scholarly observations about the leg-
islative process. Social scientists have long studied the phenomenon of omnibus 
bills in Congress, through which legislators bundle numerous, often unrelated, 
provisions.
27
 Positive theories propose that omnibus vehicles allow legislators to 
advance partisan agendas, engage in distributive logrolling, or pass otherwise 
unpopular measures.
28
 Normative reformers, in turn, have often called for stat-
utory unbundling. Single-subject rules found in many state constitutions, for 
example, limit bills and referenda to one subject.
29
 The line-item veto similarly 
facilitates statutory unbundling by the executive branch.
30
 
This Article explores analogous insights in the regulatory context in the 
hopes of spurring a broader research agenda akin to the decades of studies pur-
sued in the legislative arena. The effort here is primarily one of theory building, 
and in that spirit we include preliminary empirical analyses to explore intuitions 
and generate hypotheses for more rigorous testing in future work. This study 
also attempts to complicate existing debates about agency behavior. Take rule 
counts. Popular media and academic studies often rely on them to convey the 
magnitude of agency regulatory activity.
31
 But such counting exercises cannot 
 
27. See, e.g., GLEN S. KRUTZ, HITCHING A RIDE: OMNIBUS LEGISLATING IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 45 
(2001) [hereinafter KRUTZ, HITCHING A RIDE] (examining the dynamics giving rise to omni-
bus bills); BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN 
THE U.S. CONGRESS 112 (4th ed. 2012) (identifying examples of omnibus legislation); Johanna 
M.M. Goertz, Omnibus or Not: Package Bills and Single-Issue Bills in a Legislative Bargaining 
Game, 36 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 547 (2011) (comparing single-issue and omnibus bills in 
legislative bargaining); Glen S. Krutz, Getting Around Gridlock: The Effect of Omnibus Utiliza-
tion on Legislative Productivity, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 533 (2000) (assessing omnibus legislation’s 
influence on legislative productivity); Glen S. Krutz, Tactical Maneuvering on Omnibus Bills in 
Congress, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 210 (2001) (studying how and why omnibus bills are created). 
28. See KRUTZ, HITCHING A RIDE, supra note 27, at 32-33. 
29. See Single Subject Rules, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 8, 2009), http://www.ncsl.org
/research/elections-and-campaigns/single-subject-rules [https://perma.cc/99LP-EL39]. 
Many of them require the single subject to be included in the bill’s title. See WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION & REGULATION: STATUTES AND 
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 309 (5th ed. 2014). 
30. This mechanism currently permits state governors in about forty-three states to veto “items” 
from appropriations bills, subject to legislative override. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 29, at 
314. 
31. See, e.g., Thomas J. Donohue, The Regulatory Tsunami--How a Tidal Wave of Regulations Is 
Drowning America, U.S. CHAMBER COMM. (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.uschamber.com/press
/speeches/2010/regulatory-tsunami-how-tidal-wave-regulations-drowning-america 
[https://perma.cc/5URR-WSX4] (claiming that “approximately 4,000 rules from nearly 70 
departments and agencies filled the regulatory pipeline in 2008”). Academic scholarship also 
relies on rule counts, though it is often aware of this measure’s limitations. See, e.g., Anne 
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meaningfully capture the scope of an agency’s rulemaking. One rule can set 
standards for an entire industry, while another addresses narrow compliance is-
sues. A third might deal with technical or routine matters and have only a tem-
porary effect,
32
 while a fourth is wholly deregulatory.
33
 Rule counts are thus of-
ten misleading indicators of regulatory activity. 
Appreciating agency bundling, however, helps to refine thinking about the 
relevant units of analysis. If compliance burdens are a concern, for example, it 
may be more sensible to measure costs than to tally rules. Understanding bun-
dling behavior also enriches and complements work on the strategic timing of 
agency decisions and the more dynamic aspects of rulemaking behavior.
34
 Agen-
cies can simply delay controversial provisions, for example, by splitting them 
from a particular rule to save for future rulemakings. 
Part I analyzes the concept and operationalization of regulatory bundling. It 
uses a unique dataset obtained from nearly twenty years of rulemaking across a 




Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Adminis-
trative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 922 n.101 (2008) (acknowledging that a database “looking 
at counts of various rulemaking activities” will “miss many details of individual rulemakings” 
“because they are aggregate measures”); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing 
the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950-
1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1445 (2012) (describing their database as “essentially 
count[ing] the number of [notices of proposed rulemaking] and final rules issued by each 
agency over time”). 
32. See, e.g., Drawbridge Operation Regulations; China Basin, San Francisco, CA, 78 Fed. Reg. 
19585 (Apr. 2, 2013) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 117) (specifying a provisional deviation 
from a bridge operating schedule). 
33. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Manage-
ment, Games, and Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 198 n.41 (1994) (discussing 
how it is impossible “for the untutored eye to discern from the reporting in the Unified 
Agenda of Federal Regulations whether activity levels are primarily in a regulatory or dereg-
ulatory direction”). 
34. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and Trans-
parency in the Administrative State, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1161-62 (2009) (suggesting that 
agencies cannot “bury” bad news, but that timing decisions can affect monitoring costs); Ra-
chel Augustine Potter, Slow-Rolling, Fast-Tracking, and the Pace of Bureaucratic Decisions in 
Rulemaking, 79 J. POL. 841 (2017) (examining agency timing to avoid oversight); Wendy 
Wagner et al., Dynamic Rulemaking, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 183 (2017) (exploring agency incentives 
to update and revise rules). 
35. Uniquely, the dataset draws directly from the Federal Register, which is the government’s 
“official daily publication for rules, proposed rules, and notices of Federal agencies and organ-
izations.” About Federal Register, GOV’T PUB. OFF., http://www.gpo.gov/help/about_federal
_register.htm [https://perma.cc/5YWD-NNVH]. Since agencies must publish in its pages 
for their rules to gain legal effect, the Federal Register provides the most comprehensive look 
possible at agencies’ rulemaking behavior. See 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (2018); O’Connell, supra note 
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The results suggest that bundling is increasingly common. Agencies seem more 
likely to bundle issues in their rulemaking efforts today than they were even a 
short time ago. Moreover, agencies appear to adopt a wide variety of practices 
with respect to bundling: some bundle a great deal, and others do so rarely. 
Part II explores the various actors internal and external to the agency that 
likely influence the agency’s bundling decisions. It considers the regulatory 
drafting process within agencies as well as the ways political and judicial moni-
tors themselves can package and split rules. Basic empirical analysis suggests that 
independent and executive agencies bundle differently, perhaps reflecting the 
meaningful influence of presidential review coordinated by the Office of Infor-
mation and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). In addition, executive agencies appear 
to bundle slightly more under divided government; that is, when at least one 
house of Congress is of a different political party. Elections also seem to have an 
effect in favor of less bundling. 
Finally, Part III acknowledges concerns that regulatory bundling raises about 
political accountability, public participation, and legislative fidelity. Regulatory 
bundling may allow agencies to overwhelm political and judicial overseers, as 
well as to short-circuit the notice-and-comment process. Our analysis indeed 
suggests that agencies bundle more subjects into final, as opposed to proposed, 
rules. At the same time, this Part recognizes that bundling yields benefits as well 
and recommends further empirical work to assess the trade-offs. In doing so, it 
highlights the possibilities and pitfalls of regulatory single-subject rules and the 
functional line-item veto exercised by the President through OIRA. Courts may 
also have a limited role to play in policing bundling through arbitrary-or-capri-
cious review and the logical-outgrowth doctrine. 
i .  bundling dynamics 
Scholars have long confronted the question of why regulations exist.
36
 Far 
less studied is the question of how agencies regulate through legislative rules. 
How do they structure their regulations, disaggregate regulatory obligations un-
 
31, at 928 (“Publication in the Federal Register is the official means of notifying the public of 
new regulations, and agency activity cannot be hidden if agencies expect anyone to comply 
with their rules.”); Randy S. Springer, Note, Gatekeeping and the Federal Register: An Analysis 
of the Publication Requirement of Section 552(a)(1)(D) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 41 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 533, 544 (1989) (“Agency documents that fall within the provisions of the publi-
cation rule of section 552(a)(1)(D) and are not so published are ineffective against a party 
without actual notice.”). 
36. See, e.g., ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 132 (4th ed. 1932) (positing a 
public-interest theory of regulation); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (developing an industry-capture theory of regulation). 
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der the same statutory grant, or aggregate them across multiple statutory provi-
sions under the auspices of a single rule? This Part tackles some foundational 
issues. First, it defines and operationalizes the concept of regulatory bundling. It 
then presents a preliminary empirical overview of the phenomenon across agen-
cies and across time. In doing so, it reveals historical trends in agency behavior 
and reflects on potential sources of heterogeneity. 
A. Concept and Measurement 
Regulatory bundling refers to agencies’ discretion to aggregate or disaggre-
gate provisions during a single rulemaking. Put differently, agencies can make 
many policy decisions in a rule or simply resolve one policy at a time. That dis-
cretion appears to be legislatively blessed: the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) defines a “rule” as “the whole or a part of an agency statement of general 
or particular applicability and future effect.”
37
 While the legislative history of the 
APA is unilluminating,
38
 the text seems to anticipate that a rule can constitute 
either an entire agency statement of generality or just a portion of one. Rules, in 
other words, can resolve a set of subjects or simply component parts: the speci-
fication of a policy question, legal interpretation, enforcement scheme, or pen-
alty structure, to name a few possibilities. 
Although the core concept of regulatory bundling is relatively straightfor-
ward, it raises challenging analytic and practical questions. Crisply delineating a 
“subject” or “issue” is notoriously challenging, as later discussed.
39
 Equally dif-
ficult is deciding how to operationalize the degree of bundling observed: what is 
the best way to identify the extent to which an agency has “bundled”? One intu-
 
37. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2018) (emphasis added). Some have written about the APA’s definition of 
a rule, but they do not seem to have focused on the specific meaning of “whole or a part.” See, 
e.g., Sean Croston, It Means what It Says: Deciphering and Respecting the APA’s Definition of 
“Rule,” 53 WASHBURN L.J. 27 (2013); Ronald M. Levin, The Case for (Finally) Fixing the APA’s 
Definition of “Rule,” 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1077 (2004). 
38. The House and Senate committee hearings and reports from the APA’s legislative history fo-
cus on the evolution of the “general or particular applicability” provision, but neither the Fed-
eral Register Act nor the legislative history materials make any reference to the “whole or a 
part” language. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1511 (2018); S. REP. NO. 89-813 (1965); H.R. REP. NO. 
84-1497 (1955). The Final Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative 
Procedure, issued in 1941, was based on extensive research into contemporary practices of 
federal administrative agencies and provided much of the framework for the ultimate product. 
While the Final Report focused on agencies’ procedures for rulemaking, it never addressed 
the definition of a rule itself. See S. DOC. NO. 77-8 (1941). 
39. See infra Section III.B.2. 
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itive method might be to rely upon agencies’ own descriptions of their rulemak-
ing efforts. Rules that are explicitly characterized as combinations of previous 
rules or that contain the term “omnibus” in the title might be one method.
40
 But 
agencies are under no statutory requirement to label rules accordingly, so relying 
on this method is likely to yield inconsistent results. Agencies may also have in-
centives to characterize rules in ways that do not necessarily map onto any un-
derlying substance. A behavioral definition is thus likely to be more meaningful. 
Our preferred measure of bundling derives from a subject list that agency 
officials are required to include in proposed and final rules. Since 1982, agencies 
must include a “list of subjects” in their rules, where the subjects derive from a 
set of standardized terms identified in a thesaurus known as the Federal Register 
Thesaurus of Indexing Terms.
41
 The Office of the Federal Register (OFR) first 
proposed the creation of a thesaurus four years earlier as part of a broader effort 
to facilitate regulatory monitoring.
42
 Its initial draft drew upon terms previously 
used in indices of the Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).
43
 
The Office then consolidated and cross-referenced the terms against other pub-
lished thesauruses and indices, resulting in a preliminary version published for 
public comment.
44
 The more final version was then published in 1981 as a “dy-
namic document” that would “change through use.”
45
 In practice, however, re-




40. Cf. KRUTZ, HITCHING A RIDE, supra note 27, at 45 (considering defining “omnibus bill” by 
reference to the name of the bill, but rejecting that method). 
41. Identification of Subjects in Agency Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 7161, 7162 (Jan. 22, 1981) (to 
be codified at 1 C.F.R. pt. 18); see Telephone Interview with Amy Bunk, Dir. of Legal Affairs 
& Policy, Office of the Fed. Register, Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. (Feb. 2, 2018) [herein-
after Bunk Interview]; Telephone Interview with Brian Swidal, Senior Editor, Office of the 
Fed. Register, Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. (Apr. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Swidal Interview]. 
42. See Thesaurus of Indexing Terms, 42 Fed. Reg. 12985, 12986 (Mar. 7, 1977) (requesting public 
comment). 
43. Id. (“The subject terms included in this thesaurus were derived from terms previously used 
in Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations indexes.”). 
44. Id. (describing how proposed “terms were reviewed and consolidated and a cross-reference 
structure showing the relationships between terms was added,” after which “[v]arious pub-
lished thesauruses and indexes were consulted in selecting terms and cross-references”). 
45. See Federal Register Thesaurus of Indexing Terms, 46 Fed. Reg. 12617, 12618 (Feb. 17, 1981). 
46. In 1983, the Office added twenty-four new terms based on its two years of experience with 
the thesaurus. Some of these terms were used as indexing terms while others were added as 
cross-references. See Federal Register Thesaurus of Indexing Terms, 48 Fed. Reg. 27646 (June 
16, 1983). Seven years later, the Office similarly added twelve more terms based on sugges-
tions from agencies and staff. See Federal Register Thesaurus of Indexing Terms, 55 Fed. Reg. 
38443, 38444 (Sept. 18, 1990). Since then, OFR has added or revised terms on the order of 
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The subject-list requirement’s stated purpose was to advance transparency 
and encourage public participation.
47
 The hope was that interested parties could 
easily find regulations of concern.
48
 The citizen with “a buzzing seat belt,” for 
example, would not have to waste time searching indices for “Cars,” “Automo-
biles,” and “Motor Vehicles,” but could instead focus on a single standardized 
term.
49
 The effort would also help the government consistently index other pub-
lications such as the Federal Register and CFR.
50
 The Administrative Committee 
of the Federal Register presciently noted that these standardized thesaurus terms 




For the past few decades, then, all proposed and final rules have included a 
list of subjects keyed to a fairly consistent standardized governmental thesaurus. 
We collect the subjects listed as a metric of the extent to which a given rule is 
“bundled.” The more subjects the rule lists from the thesaurus, the more issues 
are bundled into the rule. Consider the EPA’s Clean Power Plan final rule issued 
under the Obama Administration but now subject to repeal.
52
 The rule estab-
lished state emission guidelines for developing plans to reduce greenhouse gas 
 
two to three minor changes a quarter, with a more general organizational (as opposed to sub-
stantive) revision in 2016. See E-mail from Brian Swidal, Senior Editor, Office of the Fed. 
Register, Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., to Jennifer Nou, Professor of Law, Univ. of Chi. 
Law Sch. (May 10, 2018, 1:17 PM) (on file with authors). 
47. See Identification of Subjects in Agency Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 7162, 7162 (Jan. 22, 1981) 
(to be codified at 1 C.F.R. pt. 18) (invoking “[t]he public’s right to know about and participate 
in their Government and its day-to-day activities”). 
48. Id. (seeking to “provide a framework for information retrieval in the Federal Register sys-
tem”). 
49. See Standardization of Indexing Terms, 39 Fed. Reg. 14548, 14549 (Apr. 24, 1974). 
50. Identification of Subjects in Agency Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. at 7162 (“The identifying terms 
provided by the agencies with their regulations will be used at the OFR to expand the existing 
indexes to both the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations.”). 
51. Id. (“The use of a controlled vocabulary, a thesaurus, is intended to improve research . . . . 
Through the use of automated technology the identifying terms will also be incorporated with 
the CFR text in a computerized data base for eventual automated information retrieval.”). 
52. The Clean Power Plan was promulgated in October 2015. See Carbon Pollution Emission 
Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 
64662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). More recently, EPA proposed to 
repeal and replace the Clean Power Plan. See Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units, 83 Fed. Reg. 44746 (proposed Aug. 31, 
2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60); Electric Utility Generating Units: Repealing 
the Clean Power Plan, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/stationary 
-sources-air-pollution/electric-utility-generating-units-repealing-clean-power-plan 
[https://perma.cc/5Q9E-79ML]. 
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emissions from existing power plants.
53
 It also required states to monitor their 
progress and provide periodic reports.
54
 Accordingly, the final rule listed the fol-
lowing subjects: “Environmental protection, Administrative practice and proce-
dure, Air pollution control, Intergovernmental relations, [and] Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements.”
55
 Based on this list, our bundling measure would 
record a value of five: the Agency listed five qualitative subjects. 
By contrast, take another final rule promulgated by EPA, this time dealing 
with hazardous waste.
56
 In this rule, EPA listed waste generated from the pro-
duction of identified dyes; pigments; and food, drug, and cosmetic colorants as 
“hazardous” when it exceeded particular thresholds or was not treated or dis-
posed of properly.
57
 The determination followed three previous proposals on the 
discrete issue.
58
 The rule also addressed a number of other subjects. For example, 
it added five toxic constituents to the list of hazardous constituents that served 
as the basis for classifying wastes as hazardous.
59
 It added another seven constit-
uents to a separate list of hazardous constituents that formed the basis for the 
current waste listing. In addition, the rule established land-disposal-restrictions 
standards for the identified wastes and also designated them as hazardous sub-
stances subject to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the list of subjects identified many 
more unique subjects than the Clean Power Plan rule discussed earlier: twenty-




53. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.5740-.5790 (2018). 
54. Id. §§ 60.5865, 60.5870. 
55. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Gen-
erating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64941. 
56. Hazardous Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste; Dyes 
and/or Pigments Production Wastes; Land Disposal Restrictions for Newly Identified 
Wastes; CERCLA Hazardous Substance Designation and Reportable Quantities; Designation 
of Five Chemicals as Appendix VIII Constituents; Addition of Four Chemicals to the Treat-
ment Standards of F039 and the Universal Treatment Standards, 70 Fed. Reg. 9138 (Feb. 24, 
2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 148, 261, 268, 271, 302). 
57. Id. at 9141. 
58. Id. at 9143. 
59. Id. at 9142. 
60. The list of subjects included the following nonduplicative terms: Administrative practice and 
procedure; Hazardous waste; Reporting and record keeping requirements; Water supply; En-
vironmental protection; Hazardous materials; Waste treatment and disposal; Recycling; 
Waste management; Land Disposal Restrictions; Treatment Standards; Confidential busi-
ness information; Hazardous material transportation; Indians—lands; Intergovernmental re-
lations; Penalties; Water pollution control; Air pollution control; Chemicals; Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act; Extremely hazardous substances; Hazardous 
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In this manner, the measure roughly captures the number of issues addressed 
in a rulemaking based on the expert judgment of agency officials themselves. A 
major strength of this approach is that it relies on human coding by reference to 
a standardized and relatively uniform codebook (the thesaurus), an approach 
often referred to as the “gold standard” in social science research.
61
 Human, as 
opposed to computer-automated coding, allows for the judgment and context 
necessary when parsing language.
62
 By contrast, alternative approaches such as 
topic modeling, which attempts to classify the “topics” in a natural language cor-
pus using algorithms,
63
 are widely considered second-best solutions to be used 
when the resource costs required for human coding are prohibitive.
64
 To be sure, 
humans can be strategic about the measure in ways that automated approaches 
would not be. The OFR, however, generally reviews agency submissions, albeit 
in an “advisory” manner and with a “light touch.”
65
 While the review does not 
focus heavily on the subject list,
66
 the threat of oversight may nevertheless help 
mitigate the possibility. The OFR and its agency liaisons, who are responsible 




chemicals; Hazardous substances; Natural resources; Superfund; Waste treatment and dis-
posal. 
61. See Paul DiMaggio, Adapting Computational Text Analysis to Social Science (and Vice Versa), BIG 
DATA & SOC’Y, July-Dec. 2015, at 1, 2-3 (noting that “human reasoning is routinely described 
as a ‘gold standard’ against which algorithmic output should be judged”); Laura K. Nelson et 
al., The Future of Coding: A Comparison of Hand-Coding and Three Types of Computer-
Assisted Text Analysis Methods 3 (Mar. 13, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with au-
thors) (observing that “[m]ost social scientists continue to rely on traditional human coding 
methods as the gold standard for the analysis of such phenomena”); see also Justin Grimmer 
& Brandon M. Stewart, Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis 
Methods for Political Texts, 21 POL. ANALYSIS 267, 268 (2013) (“[T]he complexity of language 
implies that automated content analysis methods will never replace careful and close reading 
of texts.”). 
62. Grimmer & Stewart, supra note 61, at 270 (acknowledging that “all automated methods are 
based on incorrect models of language” but that automation can usefully complement or sup-
plement human coding). 
63. For the seminal piece on this topic, see David M. Blei et al., Latent Dirichlet Allocation, 3 J. 
MACHINE LEARNING RES. 993 (2003). 
64. See sources cited supra note 61. 
65. Bunk Interview, supra note 41; Swidal Interview, supra note 41. 
66. Bunk Interview, supra note 41; see also Swidal Interview, supra note 41 (explaining the review 
process). 
67. See 2015 Federal Register Conference, OFF. FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/reader 
-aids/office-of-the-federal-register-blog/2015/06/2015-federal-register-liaison-conference 
[https://perma.cc/TWU6-MMPP] (“Each federal agency is required to designate an individ-
ual as a point of contact for all documents their agency publishes in the Federal Register.”). 
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Another critique may note that the measure could double count the number 
of issues when officials list both “general” and “specific” terms.
69
 “Air transpor-
tation” and “air taxis” both appear in the thesaurus, for example, so a rule relat-
ing to air taxis could list both subjects. It is also possible that the thesaurus is not 
specific enough in some areas, and that multiple “issues” could appear under one 
general heading. Instead of double counting, it could be that the thesaurus is not 
granular enough. We address some of these concerns in the Appendix by creat-
ing an “adjusted” measure that accounts for the presence of both specific and 
general terms for a rule. We are able to do so based on the thesaurus itself, which 
notates when terms may be more specific than others.
70
 Importantly, we find that 
none of our results change qualitatively with this adjusted measure. 
Finally, yet another concern may be intercoder reliability—that is, the extent 
to which independent coders at different agencies evaluate the content of interest 
and reach the same conclusion. Ensuring consistency across dozens of agencies 
with varying staff capacities is undoubtedly a difficult task.
71
 Mitigating these 
concerns, however, is the fact that agency rule writers are provided coding guid-
ance in a document-drafting handbook published by the OFR.
72
 The handbook 
applies to all documents published in the Federal Register, including rules.
73
 The 
handbook encourages rule writers to choose standardized terms based on the 
CFR part designation.
74
 The handbook then directs readers to the thesaurus’s 
 
68. One test of the possibility of strategic listing of subjects would involve examining changes in 
listing behavior around the time of sharp transitions in the oversight environment—condi-
tional on a less manipulable (even if noisier) measure of the bundling content. We considered 
such a test based on transitions of congressional control but concluded that the most plausible 
alternative metric of bundling, sections of the Code of Federal Regulations touched by the 
rule, though harder to manipulate, was too coarse to meaningfully account for dynamics in 
rule content. Nevertheless, those results indicate few signs of strategic listing behavior, and 
we make them available on request. 
69. See Swidal Interview, supra note 41 (acknowledging the potential overlap between general and 
specific terms). 
70. E-mail from Brian Swidal, Senior Editor, Office of the Fed. Register, Nat’l Archives & Records 
Admin., to Authors (May 2, 2018) (on file with authors). 
71. See Swidal Interview, supra note 41 (describing different coding practices at different agen-
cies). 
72. Office of the Fed. Register, Document Drafting Handbook, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN. 
(Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/write/handbook/ddh.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SM42-7U4V]. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 2-15, 3-20. 
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website, which contains a link to the indexing terms associated with each CFR 
part.
75
 In this manner, the guidance encourages interagency consistency by 
providing a standardized list of terms as a starting point, based on how the reg-
ulation will eventually be codified. 
*** 
As for the dataset of underlying rules, the entries derive from the Federal 
Register between 2000 and 2017, amounting to almost twenty years of rulemak-
ing data.
76
 Unless they provide actual notice or personal service on the poten-
tially affected parties, agencies are legally required to publish their final rules in 
the Federal Register.
77
 Thus, these data are likely the most comprehensive look 
possible at the universe of proposed and final rulemakings. Earlier efforts to 
study agency behavior, by contrast, have relied almost exclusively on Unified 
Agenda entries to capture rulemaking behavior.
78 
Yet most scholars have 
 
75. Code of Federal Regulations List of Subjects, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., https://www
.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/subjects.html [https://perma.cc/4HST-QX93]; see also 
Telephone Interview with Andrew Emery, President, Regulatory Grp. (Apr. 10, 2018) [here-
inafter Emery Interview] (explaining the process of listing subjects). 
76. For a more detailed discussion of rulemaking data, see Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz, 
Strategic Rulemaking Disclosure, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (2016). The Appendix also provides 
further details. 
77. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2018) (“General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the 
Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or 
otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law.”). 
78.  See, e.g., Alex Acs & Charles M. Cameron, Does White House Regulatory Review Produce a 
Chilling Effect and “OIRA Avoidance” in the Agencies?, 43 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 443, 443 
(2013); Steven J. Balla, Between Commenting and Negotiation: The Contours of Public Participa-
tion in Agency Rulemaking, 1 I/S 59, 70 (2005) (“[U]se of the Unified Agenda ensures that the 
set of rulemakings under study represents as complete a snapshot as possible of [Department 
of Transportation rulemaking activities].”); Steven J. Balla, Political Control, Bureaucratic Dis-
cretion, and Public Commenting on Agency Regulations, 93 PUB. ADMIN. 524, 536 n.12 (2014); 
Steven J. Balla & John R. Wright, Consensual Rule Making and the Time It Takes to Develop 
Rules, in POLITICS, POLICY, AND ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS IN THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF BU-
REAUCRACY 187, 206 n.5 (George A. Krause & Kenneth J. Meier eds., 2003); Jack M. Beer-
mann, Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 285, 319 (2013); Steven 
J. Groseclose, Reinventing the Regulatory Agenda: Conclusions from an Empirical Study of EPA’s 
Clean Air Act Rulemaking Progress Projections, 53 MD. L. REV. 521, 533 (1994); Stephen M. John-
son, Ossification’s Demise?: An Empirical Analysis of EPA Rulemaking from 2001-2005, 38 ENVTL. 
L. 767, 780-81 (2008); Jason M. Loring & Liam R. Roth, After Midnight: The Durability of the 
Midnight Regulations Passed by the Two Previous Outgoing Administrations, 40 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1441, 1454 (2005); Michael R. See, Willful Blindness: Federal Agencies’ Failure to Comply 
with the Regulatory Flexibility Act’s Periodic Review Requirement—and Current Proposals to Invig-
orate the Act, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1199, 1215-19 (2006); Stuart Shapiro, Presidents and Pro-
cess: A Comparison of the Regulatory Process Under the Clinton and Bush (43) Administrations, 23 
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acknowledged that these data are incomplete.
79 
Overall, our dataset includes ap-
proximately 19,000 proposed rules and 41,000 final rules.
80
 In addition to the 
listed subjects, we collect the full text of the proposed and final rules, as well as 
multiple other variables of interest, such as the identity of the issuing agency, the 
date of publication, and the word count of the rule. 
B. Alternate Measures 
We also considered a number of alternative measures of bundling as a check 
to our own: one based on the number of words in the regulatory document,
81
 
and another based on the number of tie-ins to the regulatory code—that is, the 
number of CFR parts or sections listed in a rule. Both measures have strengths, 
but their limitations ultimately counsel in favor of the subject-based measure 
used here. As for the first alternative, one might be tempted to rely on the num-
ber of words in a regulation on the theory that more words imply more subjects 
or issues addressed.
82
 After all, regulatory bundling reflects the discretion of 
agencies to aggregate topics that could otherwise be addressed in separate rules. 
But there are at least two problems with this approach. First, the number of 
words may signal not several subjects, but the greater detail or complexity of a 
single subject. Second, the number of required regulatory analyses has varied 
 
J.L. & POL. 393, 400 (2007); Edward H. Stiglitz, Unaccountable Midnight Rulemaking?: A Nor-
matively Informative Assessment, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 156 (2014); Jason Webb 
Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic Performance: Is Fed-
eral Rulemaking “Ossified”?, 20 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 261, 267-68 (2010); Jason Webb 
Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Divided Government and U.S. Federal Rulemaking, 3 REG. & GOV-
ERNANCE 128, 132 (2009); Susan Webb Yackee, The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying: Pre-Proposal 
Agenda Building and Blocking During Agency Rulemaking, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 373, 
379 (2012). 
79. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 33, at 198 n.41 (noting that his investigation into the quality of 
the Unified Agenda data was “sufficiently disappointing that [he did] not pursue[] the anal-
ysis on a more ‘scientific’ basis”); O’Connell, supra note 31, at 927 n.108 (“[The] Unified 
Agenda data are not perfect; they need confirmatory research.”). 
80. In earlier research, we find that final rules dramatically outnumber proposed rules. See Nou & 
Stiglitz, supra note 76. 
81. The rulemaking document contains both the proposal or final rule and any preambulatory 
materials. 
82. Michael Simkovic & Miao Ben Zhang, Measuring Regulation 4-5 (June 29, 2018) (un-
published manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3205589 (describing the use of word 
counts in previous studies of rulemaking). 
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across time in ways that are independent from the scope of a particular rule.
83
 
The same is true of the stringency of judicial review.
84
 As a result, word counts 
could vary because of exogenous analytic requirements rather than agency 
choices about regulatory scope. 
One might thus turn instead to a measure focused on the number of CFR 
parts or sections listed in a rule. The CFR is organized into fifty titles according 
to broad subject-matter categories, such as Environment (Title 40), Labor (Title 
29), and Transportation (Title 49). These titles are then organized into chapters, 
parts, and sections.
85
 As relevant here, the chapter designation usually contains 
the rules of the issuing agency and often bears the agency’s name.
86
 The part, in 
turn, often contains rules regarding a single program or agency function. The 
section, however, is “the basic unit of the CFR” and “typically contains one pro-
vision of program/function rules.”
87
 Thus, counting the number of CFR parts 
or sections cited in a rule might give one a sense of the number of topics ad-
dressed in the rulemaking. The main problem with this approach, though, is the 
lack of rationalization and organization of the CFR across agencies.
88
 Different 
agencies have made different choices about how to codify their provisions, re-
sulting in a nonstandardized unit of analysis.
89
 By contrast, the subject-based 




Despite these drawbacks, one would nonetheless expect positive correlations 
between the number of subjects listed and these indicia. Indeed, all of these in-
dicia correlate positively (albeit weakly) with the measure of bundling in our 
dataset, suggesting its validity. The correlation between our measure and the log 
 
83. See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1400-36 (1992) (discussing analytic requirements imposed by courts, Con-
gress, and the executive branch). 
84. Id. at 1410-26. 
85. Standard Organization of the Code of Federal Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 21.11 (2018); see also 
Richard J. McKinney, A Research Guide to the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations, 
LAW LIBR. SOC’Y WASH. D.C. (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.llsdc.org/fr-cfr-research-guide 
[https://perma.cc/5QUD-R6Y8] (showing the suborganization of the titles). 
86. Daniel Stoehr, Understanding the Structure of the Code of Federal Regulations, DANIELS TRAINING 
SERVS. INC. (Feb. 11, 2012), https://danielstraining.com/understanding-the-structure-of-the 
-code-of-federal-regulations [https://perma.cc/5TKF-XT4G]. 
87. Federal Register Tutorial, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN. (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www 
.archives.gov/federal-register/tutorial/online-html.html#CFR [https://perma.cc/U2LB 
-QSSH]. 
88. Bunk Interview, supra note 41. 
89. Id. 
90. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text. 
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number of CFR parts is 0.07, between the number of subparts is 0.17, and be-
tween the number of words in the rulemaking document is 0.26. There is a pos-
itive relationship between measures based on the Federal Register Thesaurus, 
the number of words, and CFR parts and sections. For the sake of transparency, 
especially for those concerned with the limitations of our measure, we present 
the various empirical analyses below using the alternative approaches in the Ap-
pendix. 
C. Trends 
Let us return now to our subject-based measure. Administrative agencies ap-
pear to be increasingly bundling subjects in their rulemakings. As Figure 1 below 
illustrates, the average number of subjects has been more or less steadily increas-
ing during the last twenty years for both proposed (left panel) and final rules 
(right panel).
91
 Each dot represents the average number of subjects listed by 
agencies in proposed or final rules in a given month. The size of the dot is pro-
portional to the number of proposed or final rules issued in that month, while 
the grey line shows the trend over time. The trend is more marked for proposed 
rules. For the first twenty-four months of our series, the average proposed rule 
contained roughly 4.03 listed subjects; in the final twenty-four months of our 
series, it contained an average of approximately 4.8 listed subjects. While the 
absolute magnitude (less than one subject over the time period) should not be 
overstated, it does represent an increase of about nineteen percent, averaged 
across thousands of rules. Around 2017, one sees a dip in bundling for proposed 
rules, which may owe to features unique to the Trump Administration, such as 
those involving personnel or the transition.
92
 The number of listed subjects in 
final rules has also increased, but more gradually. For final rules, the average 
number of listed subjects increased from about 4.4 in the opening twenty-four 
 
91. Specifically, we create monthly bins of rules and calculate the average number of subjects in 
each bin. The left panel of the figure presents the results for proposed rules; the right panel, 
final rules. Within each panel, time runs on the x-axis and the indicated measure runs on the 
y-axis. The vertical dashed lines represent shifts in administrations, each dot represents the 
average for the relevant metric in a month, and the line shows the trends over time. The trend 
line is produced using a locally weighted average of the months, so that at any point the line 
represents the average proportion, with months closer to that point weighted more heavily 
than months farther from that point. 
92. Note that in the smoothed average the point of inflection occurs before 2017; it is at this earlier 
point that the end of the series begins to influence the smoothed average. That point of in-
flection, however, is sensitive to the choice of smoothing parameter. The raw data, as revealed 
in the points, suggest that an abrupt change occurred around 2017, that is, around the time of 
the change in administrations. 
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This observation could reflect a broader phenomenon: policy-making in-
struments across a variety of settings have become longer and more complex over 
time. Both statutes and Supreme Court opinions, for example, reflect this dy-
namic.
94
 Specific explanations vary, but these phenomena likely reflect related 
causes. For instance, the economic and social conditions that the law seeks to 
regulate have become more interdependent and uncertain over time.
95
 At the 
same time, the costs of storing, searching, and retrieving legal knowledge have 
decreased as consumers of the law—from lawyers to judges to the public—now 
have greater access to sophisticated legal technology, further encouraging 
lengthy and complex legal documents.
96
 For these reasons, legal instruments as 
a whole often address more subjects. 
  
 
93. An interesting feature of these trends is that we do not observe a corresponding dip in bun-
dling for final rules around 2017. One interpretation of this pattern is that new proposed rules 
exhibit more sensitivity to transitions in administration than final rules. For instance, final 
rules may have momentum behind them, with influential stakeholders largely in agreement 
with the content of the rule. 
94. See, e.g., Michael J. Bommarito II & Daniel M. Katz, A Mathematical Approach to the Study of 
the United States Code, 389 PHYSICA A 4195, 4195 (2010) (finding that the “Code has grown in 
its amount of structure, interdependence and language”); Adam Liptak, Justices Are Long on 
Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11
/18/us/18rulings.html [https://perma.cc/UTW5-B293] (reporting that the “number of 
words per decision has been climbing”). 
95. See Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 
25 (1992). 
96. Id. 
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FIGURE 1. 
BUNDLING ACTIVITY TRENDS: 2000-17 
 
Administrative agencies may likewise engage in more bundling due to a 
number of related developments in the regulatory state. A new rule today is likely 
to touch on several existing rules or implicate a number of overlapping statutes.
97
 
New regulations are written against the backdrop of an increasing store of exist-
ing legal obligations, requiring more topics to be addressed for seemingly simple 
changes. This contrasts with the earlier days of the administrative state, when 
agencies developed novel regulatory programs in more clearly delineated fields. 
Congress, too, has increasingly delegated policy issues to multiple agencies, 
compelling agencies to write joint rules dealing with a greater number of top-
ics.
98
 As more agencies become involved, they may spot a greater number of is-
sues implicated. The increase may also be explained as a behavioral reaction to 
 
97. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 863 (2006) (noting that 
with regulatory “growth has come a concomitant increase in the engagement of regulatory 
institutions across jurisdictional lines”). 
98. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 
2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201; Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory 
Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012). 
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political and judicial oversight or greater litigation threats from those involved 
in the public-comment process. Perhaps bundling has become the favored strat-
egy for overwhelming resource-constrained opponents. 
To shed some light on these various dynamics, note that some agencies bun-
dle more than others. Specifically, Figure 2 below shows that several agencies—
such as EPA, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and 
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)—issue a larger number of bundled 
rules on average.
99
 By contrast, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Com-
merce tend not to issue proposed or final rules with many listed subjects; on 
average, they list fewer than two subjects per proposed or final rule. This inter-
agency variation may reflect many differences worthy of further exploration. 
EPA and HUD, for example, operate under different enabling statutes that 
may address many more issues than a narrower-mission agency like DOD. They 
may therefore have the ability to bundle in ways that DOD does not. In other 
words, Congress itself may constrain agency bundling decisions when it makes 
choices about agency jurisdiction as well as statutory scope.
100
 Alternatively, 
EPA, HUD, and the VA may also be more heavily monitored, thus inducing more 
bundling in attempts to divide and distract the attention of resource-constrained 
interest groups or to placate the various stakeholders in play. These agencies, as 
a group, receive more public attention than, say, the General Services Admin-
istration (GSA). In addition, the trends may also reflect changes in underlying 
rulemaking behavior outside of bundling and splitting incentives. Put differ-
ently, there may be differences in the composition of underlying rules that are 




99. For the full list of agency abbreviations, see infra pp.1235-37. 
100. See also Telephone Interview with Nada Culver, Senior Counsel & Senior Dir., The Wilderness 
Soc’y (Oct. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Culver Interview] (making a similar observation). 
101. Suppose, for instance, that the VA issued few rules at the start of the series and many in the 
end of the series. Overall, this would produce an upward trend in bundling over time, but 
possibly due solely to the greater activity of the VA. To account for this, one can decompose 
the increase into compositional and secular factors. In particular, one can remove composi-
tional changes, as in the VA example, by fixing the composition at the values of the first year 
in the series. Say, for instance, that the VA issued 5% of the rules in 2000. Then, going for-
ward, we weight the average subjects listed by the VA as though the VA issued 5% of the rules 
in later periods, even if in fact the VA issued 10% or 15% of the rules in those periods. This 
resembles the approach taken, for example, in Olivier Bargain & Tim Callan, Analyzing the 
Effects of Tax-Benefit Reforms on Income Distribution: A Decomposition Approach, 8 J. ECON. INEQ. 
1 (2010); and Olivier Bargain et al., Tax Policy and Income Inequality in the U.S., 1979-2007: A 
Decomposition Approach, 53 ECON. INQUIRY 1061 (2015). 
This analysis suggests that about half of the increase is due to compositional changes. For 
instance, as reported above, the number of subjects increased by about 19% between the first 
twenty-four and the last twenty-four months of the series. With the composition fixed, the 
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FIGURE 2. 
BUNDLING AT THE AGENCY LEVEL 
 
Less substantively, it is also possible that there are simply coding discrepan-
cies across administrative agencies. Perhaps coding practices at the VA differ sys-
tematically from those at the Farm Credit Administration. Finally, the drafters 
of the thesaurus may also have split subject areas in ways that are reflected in the 
results but do not necessarily correspond to behavioral choices made by particu-
lar agencies. 
 
increase reduces to about 11% for notices of proposed rulemaking. Along the same lines, for 
final rules, the unadjusted increase between the first and last twenty-four months is about 
10%. With the agency composition fixed, the increase is only about 5% using the same periods 
of comparison. The problem with this approach, however, is that these compositional changes 
are themselves endogenous to the bundling and splitting dynamics we examine. Isolating 
them is thus not a straightforward task. 
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More generally, the bundling behavior of an agency is broadly similar for 
proposed and final rules. If an agency tends to bundle in proposed rules, then it 
also tends to do so for final rules. Across agencies, the correlation between the 
number of listed subjects in proposed and final rules is 0.84. Figure 3 below plots 
the average number of subjects for final rules against the average number of sub-
jects for proposed rules. The dashed line on a forty-five-degree angle represents 
the line of perfect correspondence, such that an agency that falls on the line has 
the same number of subjects in its proposed and final rules. Agencies above the 
line tend to have more subjects in final than proposed rules, and agencies below 
the line tend to have fewer subjects in final than proposed rules. We later exam-
ine how the number of subjects evolves within a rulemaking effort from pro-
posed to final rule. 
FIGURE 3 
BUNDLING IN PROPOSED AND FINAL RULES, BY AGENCY 
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i i .  bundlers and splitters 
In light of this initial snapshot, this Part considers in more detail the incen-
tives agencies have to bundle and split rules at a given point in time. The first 
Section examines factors influencing the agency’s decision-making independent 
of external oversight, while the second Section introduces the dynamics created 
by political and judicial monitors. These dimensions, of course, are linked,
102
 but 
considering each in isolation is useful. 
A. Internal Regulatory Drafters 
1. Intra-agency Bargaining 
Like legislatures drafting statutes, agencies drafting rules require the agree-
ment of multiple internal actors. This dynamic is especially true in multimember 
commissions, which normally require a majority vote to approve a rule.
103
 But 
even in single-headed agencies, regulatory drafting involves many internal con-
stituencies with conflicting points of view.
104
 Career staff in the relevant program 
office approach the rule with their subject-matter expertise.
105
 Lawyers from the 
general counsel’s office bring their legal perspectives.
106
 Policy analysts or econ-
omists may press cost-benefit or other decision-making frameworks.
107
 All are 
 
102. Cf. Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation 
of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 426 (2009) (describing “internal separation of powers mecha-
nisms” and arguing that separation-of-powers doctrines have failed to “directly connect in-
ternal and external constraints”). 
103. See, e.g., Bradley C. Canon, Voting Behavior on the FCC, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 587 (1969) 
(discussing the voting patterns and partisan affiliations of commissioners on the Federal 
Communications Commission). 
104. See WESLEY A. MAGAT ET AL., RULES IN THE MAKING: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY 
AGENCY BEHAVIOR 74 (1986) (describing “[c]onflict between the drafters of the rule and the 
economic analysis group” within a given rulemaking agency); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Ver-
meule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1072 (2011) (discussing how 
“[a]gency structure and required processes . . . allocate authority within the agency . . . to ex-
perts in the ‘middle’ of the agency . . . [or] to political appointees at the top of the 
agency . . . [or] to agency personnel at the bottom of the agency”). 
105. See, e.g., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION 
RULEMAKING MANUAL 7 (2000), http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.dev/files/docs
/FHWARulemaking%20Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/DMF6-3CCA] [hereinafter FHWA 
MANUAL] (identifying the “program office” as the “technical office responsible for . . . [d]raft-
ing rulemaking documents”). 
106. Magill & Vermeule, supra note 104, at 1061. 
107. Id. at 1051. 
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usually involved in the first stages of regulatory drafting, during which they will 
determine the initial scope of the regulation. These rule-writing teams typically 
decide which provisions the regulations should contain as a preliminary matter. 
Of course, agency management can also determine the initial scope of a rule 
when composing these teams in the first place.
108
 
Regulatory bundling facilitates negotiations between these different internal 
groups. Say a policy analyst determines that a regulation dealing with issue A 
interferes with her objectives on some other issue B. The program officer who is 
coordinating the rule may offer to include provisions relating to issue B to secure 
the cooperation of the policy analyst. This scenario would result in an increase 
in bundling due to internal politicking at the agency. Alternatively, a lawyer may 
conclude that a particular part of the rule is subject to a statutory deadline and 
therefore must be expedited. She might thus convince the team to split off that 
piece from the rest of the rule, which has a slower timetable. This give-and-take 
will likely continue until a consensus has been reached. 
From there, the draft rule will then undergo an agency-specific clearance 
procedure involving review by others in the agency, as well as up the hierarchy 
to political appointees.
109
 At this point, many other offices are likely to be in-
volved. Rule drafters within the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) must secure 
the approval of a branch reviewer; the Associate, Deputy, and Chief Counsels; 
the Assistant to the Commissioner; and, finally, the Commissioner before mov-
ing on to the Treasury Department for final authorization.
110
 The Federal High-
way Administration requires concurrence from the Agency’s other program of-
fices, then its legal division, its Legislation and Regulations Division, and, finally, 
the Agency’s Chief Counsel.
111
 Generally speaking, those in these clearance 
chains do not possess hard internal vetoes in the sense that they can unilaterally 
stop the rulemaking from proceeding.
112
 However, they can delay the draft rules 




108. See Emery Interview, supra note 75. 
109. See Jennifer Nou, Intra-agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 468 (2015) (discussing 
internal clearance procedures). 
110. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.1.6.8.4 (2018), http://
www.irs.gov/irm/part32/irm_32-001-006.html [https://perma.cc/WWH3-2RU6]. 
111. See FHWA MANUAL, supra note 105, at 8. 
112. See Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36 
CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 94 (2014) (“[O]ne government office ordinarily cannot authoritatively 
stop the issuance of a document by its sibling office.”). 
113. Id. (“[I]t is possible to give an office assigned a clearance role something very close to that 
power, by structuring the conflict resolution procedure so that it is the operational office that 
needs to ‘appeal’ a clearance denial.”). 
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As a result, rule-writing teams may bundle or split rules to mollify the actual 
or anticipated resistance faced within the agency. If a team within the IRS, for 
example, expects that a specific provision will ultimately be rejected by a newly 
appointed Chief Counsel, it can split off that provision for a future rulemaking—
perhaps when a more sympathetic Chief Counsel has been appointed. Splitting 
controversial provisions can help ensure that regulatory efforts are not sunk by 
skittish agency heads.
114
 At the same time, drafters may also bundle a large num-
ber of regulatory provisions together in the hopes that more controversial pro-
visions fly under the radar. In other words, bundling can allow what amount to 
regulatory riders: provisions that are only tenuously related to the rule, but nev-
ertheless attached in order to facilitate passage.
115
 
Should disagreements regarding rule writing amongst these offices never-
theless persist, clearance procedures also specify how these issues should be ele-
vated up the agency hierarchy and which higher-level policy official should ulti-
mately resolve the dispute.
116
 At EPA, for instance, the Deputy Administrator 
has been designated to adjudicate these disagreements,
117
 though she may ele-
vate the most controversial issues to the Administrator.
118
 By comparison, the 
Commissioner of the IRS specifies that the Associate Chief Counsel within a di-
vision should usually resolve the dispute, though the matter could also be ele-
vated to higher levels when necessary.
119
 Indeed, in most agencies, the ultimate 
 
114. See Emery Interview, supra note 75. 
115. Id. 
116. The FHWA Manual, for instance, explicitly states that the rulemaking team is responsible for 
“resolv[ing] issues or elevat[ing] issues to management for resolution.” FHWA MANUAL, 
supra note 105, at 8. Similarly, EPA provides that “[i]f workgroup members cannot agree, the 
issues of disagreement should be presented to management for resolution.” EPA’s Action De-
velopment Process: Guidance for EPA Staff on Developing Quality Actions, ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY 34 (2011), http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab%5CSABPRODUCT.NSF/5088B3878A90053
E8525788E005EC8D8/$File/adp03-00-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Z3X-TCD7] [hereinafter 
EPA’s Action Development Process]; see id. at 71 (discussing the process of informal and formal 
elevation of disagreements to management and other policy officials such as the Administra-
tor). 
117. See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 57 (1975) 
(“By the nature of the way EPA is (dis)organized, really sticky issues are escalated at least to 
the [Deputy Assistant Administrator] level and maybe higher for resolution.” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Memorandum from a Senior EPA Official to William F. Pedersen, Jr., At-
torney, Envtl. Prot. Agency (May 4, 1975))). 
118. See EPA’s Action Development Process, supra note 116, at 71 (noting that issues could ulti-
mately be formally elevated to the Administrator, though doing so would be “unusual” except 
for the most significant rules). 
119. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 110, § 32.1.6.3. 
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authority to bundle or split a rule lies with the statutorily designated political 
appointee, usually the head of the agency. 
The dynamics become even more complicated when there are several agency 
heads involved—as in joint rulemakings or on multimember boards and com-
missions like the Securities and Exchange Commission or the National Labor 
Relations Board.
120
 Individual commissioners and board members for a given 
agency often arrive in staggered terms, appointed by different Presidents, and 
sometimes as a result of party-balancing requirements.
121
 They approach their 
jobs from different backgrounds, career experiences, and priorities.
122
 Conse-
quently, these agency heads often desire different regulatory outcomes, even 
when they are nominally members of the same political party.
123
 In such situa-
tions, they can strike compromises through bundled rules by exchanging certain 
favored provisions for less favored ones.
124
 This strategy becomes particularly 
attractive when the agency is unlikely to engage in further rulemaking on a par-
ticular topic because of political constraints. Under these circumstances, there is 
more pressure to resolve disagreements within the context of a single rule. 
In this manner, regulatory bundling may be explained by internal negotia-
tions within an agency drafting the rule. Diverse agency constituencies, includ-
ing programmatic career staff, policy analysts, and lawyers can engage in bar-
gaining when deciding the scope of a rule. These negotiations then can extend 
across agency offices as the rule undergoes a horizontal review process. From 
there, any remaining disagreements will be elevated up to political appointees 
who may further decide to add or split the subjects addressed in the rulemaking. 
 
120. See generally MARSHALL J. BREGER & GARY J. EDLES, INDEPENDENT AGENCIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES: LAW, STRUCTURE, AND POLITICS (2015) (discussing the complex dynamics of multi-
member independent agencies). 
121. See Brian D. Feinstein & Daniel J. Hemel, Partisan Balance with Bite, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 14 
(2018) (describing “the effect of [partisan balance requirements] on the ideological composi-
tion of multimember Agencies”); Daniel E. Ho, Congressional Agency Control: The Impact of 
Statutory Partisan Requirements on Regulation 1-3 (Am. Law & Econ. Ass’n Annual Meetings, 
Working Paper No. 73, 2007), http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2219
&context=alea [https://perma.cc/FX3F-AYU3] (discussing the debate over statutory partisan 
requirements for regulatory commissions). 
122. See BREGER & EDLES, supra note 120, at 96. 
123. See Sharon B. Jacobs, Administrative Dissents, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541, 572-75 (2017). 
124. See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of 
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (2000) (noting that independent 
agencies “are also multi-member organizations, a fact that tends toward accommodation of 
diverse or extreme views through the compromise inherent in the process of collegial deci-
sionmaking”). 
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When there are multiple agency heads, regulatory bundling allows for logrolling 
and negotiation to occur before rules are subject to a vote. 
2. Rule-Production Costs 
Beyond internal agency compromises, the production costs of regulatory 
drafting may affect bundling behavior as well. In thinking about the resource 
burdens of writing a rule, it is helpful to distinguish between the fixed, variable, 
and marginal costs. A fixed cost is any cost that does not vary with the number 
of subjects addressed in a rule.
125
 For instance, agencies that decide to engage in 
rulemaking must establish a docket,
126
 secure boilerplate templates, and draft 
other standardized language necessary to conform to the Federal Register Doc-
ument Drafting Handbook.
127
 In addition, most agencies require internal man-
agement-related paperwork from rule-writing offices seeking permission to 
begin regulatory drafting.
128
 These documents often require an abstract of the 
contemplated regulation and supporting justification.
129
 
The presence of fixed production costs generally encourages regulatory bun-
dling. Bundling allows agencies to address more issues while paying the fixed 
costs only once. That is, bundling allows for greater administrative efficiency. 
Splitting the issues into separate rulemakings, by contrast, requires the agency 
to pay the fixed costs repeatedly.
130
 Holding all else equal, one would thus expect 
to see more bundling occur when the fixed costs of producing a rule increase. 
One would also expect the same result when an agency suffers budget cuts. Con-
versely, when fixed costs fall, agencies may be more inclined to split provisions 
into separate rules. A variable cost, by contrast, is one that varies with the num-
 
125. There are some fixed costs that agencies must absorb even if they decide not to write any rules. 
These include, for example, rule-writing staff salaries and other normal agency operating 
costs. However, these costs would seem to go to the question of how many rules an agency 
produces, not the scope of those rules. 
126. About EPA Dockets, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/dockets/about-epa 
-dockets#docket [https://perma.cc/4EK8-D67N]. 
127. Emery Interview, supra note 75. 
128. Id.; see, e.g., EPA’s Action Development Process, supra note 116, at 14 (“Prior to initiating sub-
stantive development activities, the lead office prepares and submits a tiering form describing 
the new action.”). 
129. See Emery Interview, supra note 75. 
130. Some of these fixed costs may be mitigated by the use of templates and standardized language. 
Such measures, however, still require staff members to use their time and expertise to exercise 
the necessary discretion when tailoring the templates. 
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ber of subjects addressed by a rule. Generally speaking, the more issues ad-
dressed in a regulation, the costlier the rule-drafting effort. Some obvious vari-
able costs include the resources necessary for researching additional technical is-
sues or preparing the necessary analytical documents associated with more 
issues. In addition, there are also greater publication costs in the Federal Regis-
ter, which currently charges a per-page rate.
131
 
Relatedly, marginal costs reflect the costs of adding an incremental subject 
to a rule. Marginal costs may be either increasing or decreasing. When they are 
increasing, each additional issue is costlier than the last; when they are decreas-
ing, each additional issue, though still costly, is less costly than the previous one. 
Therefore, increasing marginal costs would tend to discourage agencies from is-
suing rules that touch on many subjects, while decreasing marginal costs offer 
economies of scale and thus encourage bundling. There are good reasons to be-
lieve that the marginal costs of regulatory drafting decrease at some point, 
though they are likely generally increasing given inevitable resource constraints. 
They may decrease, that is, when a rule-writing team gains the requisite exper-
tise necessary to regulate (or deregulate) in a particular domain. Once a baseline 
level of knowledge has been obtained, the marginal subject addressed can be 
cheaper to resolve. However, at some other point, the team’s resources may pre-
sent a bottleneck, and the marginal costs would begin to increase sharply. Each 
additional issue the team must address becomes increasingly expensive as the 
rule writers are required to work overtime or are taken away from other higher-
priority matters. Because bundled regulations simultaneously strain agency re-
sources, this form of congestion can be challenging for agencies to accommodate 
and can lead to staffing shortages. In response, agencies may smooth out their 




While intra-agency dynamics can help to explain the scope of a rule, external 
monitors such as the President, Congress, and the courts also likely play an im-
portant role. These monitors can effectively veto rules, leading agencies to draft 
rules in their shadow. Put differently, strategic agencies can respond to the in-
centives created by executive, congressional, and judicial review. The first Sec-
 
131. Circular Letter No. 1003, GOV’T PUB. OFF. (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.gpo.gov/docs/default
-source/circular-letters-pdf-files/2018/cir1003.pdf [https://perma.cc/LG6G-2CDG] (lower-
ing per-page Federal Register publication rates). 
132. See Telephone Interview with Brenda Mallory & Marna McDermott, Conservation Litig. Pro-
ject (Sept. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Mallory & McDermott Interview] (describing this phenom-
enon). 
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tion thus explores when and why agencies may bundle or split rules when con-
fronted with oversight generally. The second Section then examines the more 
particular dynamics presented by executive, legislative, and judicial monitors. It 
also addresses the ways in which these overseers can bundle and split rules uni-
laterally and the mechanisms they use to do so. 
1. Facing Oversight 
When confronted with a monitor that can reverse its policy decision, a stra-
tegic agency faces a set of trade-offs in deciding whether to bundle or split the 
regulatory provisions it seeks to promulgate. Say an agency can either pack ten 
regulatory provisions into one rulemaking or split them into ten separate rule-
makings. What informs this choice when it comes to thwarting external review? 
Would a strategic agency prefer to bundle or split its rules? 
Much of the answer depends on the structure of monitoring costs—how 
overseers must invest resources to observe an agency’s rulemaking efforts before 
deciding to intervene.
133
 These monitors could include political monitors, such 
as the President or Congress, and judicial monitors, as well as interest groups 
and members of the public serving as “fire alarms.”
134
 It is helpful, once again, 
to refer to fixed and marginal costs, here applied to the monitoring of a given 
rulemaking effort. Fixed monitoring costs are those that do not vary with the 
scope of a rule—for example, a flat fee just to access each Federal Register entry. 
Marginal monitoring costs are the costs associated with evaluating the incremen-
tal subject in a rule. 
As an independent matter, when fixed monitoring costs are positive and ma-
terial, splitting rules is likely to be more effective than bundling in thwarting 
oversight. Ten separate rules will deplete a greater number of monitoring re-
sources than one bundled rule since monitors will have to incur set costs to eval-
uate each rule. So, as fixed monitoring costs increase, a strategic agency would 
often do better to split provisions across rules to drain the resources of their over-
seers, thus reducing oversight and opposition. At the same time, large fixed costs 
could also induce the monitor to adopt an auditing strategy, not unlike what 
 
133. See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 34, at 1170-72 (emphasizing the relationship between 
agency behavior and monitoring costs). 
134. See Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 264-71 (1987); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, 
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. 
REV. 431, 444 (1989); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight 
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984). 
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OIRA does when flagging economically significant rules.
135
 How an agency 
would adapt to these auditing strategies would depend on the auditing criteria 
as well as the number of monitors it faces. The more monitors and criteria, the 
more difficult it may be for the agency to adopt a consistent response strategy. 
Marginal monitoring costs invite different considerations. If the marginal 
costs of monitoring issues are increasing, then strategic agencies may be able to 
overwhelm overseers more effectively by bundling rather than splitting. Mar-
ginal costs may be increasing due to information-processing constraints—the 
limited resources and attention necessary to make high-quality decisions.
136
 
Bundling makes it more expensive for monitors to review because each addi-
tional subject in a rule is increasingly costly to evaluate, which may lead resource-
constrained agencies to skim over some provisions. As a result, the most conten-
tious provisions are likely to gain more attention, thus allowing less contentious 
ones to fly under the radar. In this scenario, bundling can serve to insulate some 
issues from review and reversal. Thus, under increasing marginal costs, one 
would expect agencies to engage in more bundling. Conversely, with decreasing 
marginal costs, one would expect less bundling. 
In short, the fixed and marginal costs can result in cross-cutting incentives 
for agencies. Some of these incentives are themselves dependent on the number 
of monitors agencies face as well as their salience, and on the possible auditing 
strategies that monitors might adopt. It is thus ambiguous as a matter of theory 
whether a strategic agency will be more likely to bundle or split when facing 
adverse oversight. The question must be resolved empirically and with attention 
to the possible heterogeneous effects across types of rules. 
2. Political and Judicial Review 
Agencies face slightly different incentives for how to structure their rules 
when confronted with review by the President, Congress, or the courts. Their 
ultimate bundling decisions may vary depending on which overseer they are 
likely to face most often. To explore these dynamics, this Section focuses more 
specifically on various monitors in the administrative state: the incentives they 
create as well as their ability, if any, to bundle and split agency rules themselves. 
It is important to acknowledge that interest groups and the general public are 
 
135. Monitors from smaller organizations with fewer resources may also adapt by forging relation-
ships with larger-scale monitors who may be better positioned to identify rules of mutual 
interest. See Mallory & McDermott Interview, supra note 132. Alternatively, resource-con-
strained monitors may rely on trade presses and newsletters or more informal contacts within 
agencies with better access to information about agency activities. Id.; see also Culver Inter-
view, supra note 100. 
136. See BERTRAM MYRON GROSS, THE MANAGING OF ORGANIZATIONS 857 (1964). 
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also important monitors. Their influence, however, largely operates through the 
monitors discussed below. 
a. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
The President’s principal regulatory check operates through a centralized 
process coordinated by OIRA.
137
 A bipartisan series of presidents have by exec-
utive order required executive agencies to submit proposed and final rules to 
OIRA for review.
138
 In particular, these agencies must submit “significant” rules, 
including those deemed “economically significant,” that is, those expected to 
cost $100 million or more annually.
139
 Economically significant rules are more 
likely to be publicly salient, heightening the risk of presidential reversal.
140
 Agen-
cies seeking to avoid that outcome would benefit from splitting costly rules into 
parts, each of which falls beneath the $100 million threshold.
141
 So, for example, 
an economically significant rule with an expected impact of $150 million in a 
given year could be split into two separate rules, each of which is expected to cost  
 
 
137. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1261, 1264 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Reg-
ulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1839 (2013). 
138. More precisely, any agency that is not a statutorily-defined “independent regulatory agency” 
must submit regulatory actions to OIRA for review. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(b), 3 
C.F.R. 638, 641 (1994) (defining “agency” using 44 U.S.C. § 3502(1) and excluding those 
agencies specified in § 3502(10), which has since been recodified at § 3502(5)). 
139. Id. § 6(a)(3)(B), 3 C.F.R. at 645. To be significant, a regulatory action must meet at least one 
of four sets of flexible criteria: it might raise potential inconsistencies with other agencies, 
“materially alter the budgetary impact of” certain programs, invoke “novel legal or policy is-
sues,” or be economically significant. 
140. Public logs also reveal that such rules are more likely to become the subject of meetings 
between OIRA staff and interested parties, suggesting heightened public scrutiny as well. 
See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 
U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 844, 871-72 (2003). 
141. See Declaration of Richard B. Belzer at 9, Tafas v. Dudas, 530 F. Supp. 2d 786 (E.D. Va. 2008) 
(No. 1:07-cv-00846-JCC-TRJ), http://www.rbbelzer.com/uploads/7/1/7/4/7174353/tafas
_ex-21-belzer-declaration.pdf [https://perma.cc/GY5T-4YTD] (“During my tenure in OIRA, 
I often observed agencies attempt to split draft regulations into smaller parts so as to avoid 
exceeding the $100 million threshold for a ‘major’ or ‘economically significant’ regulation, 
presumably in hopes of avoiding the requirements to prepare a Regulatory Impact Analy-
sis.”); Note, supra note 6, at 1002; Donald R. Arbuckle, OIRA and Presidential Regula-
tory Review 15 (May 3, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), https://works.bepress.com 
/donald_arbuckle/1 [https://perma.cc/684K-6378] (observing that agency officials often “di-
vided potential major rules into two or more non-major components, and in other cases they 
might argue that the estimated costs or benefits were under the $100 million threshold”). 
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$75 million in that year. Individually, neither of these rules would be designated 
as economically significant, thus effectively lowering the scrutiny of executive 
oversight. 
A strategic agency could also bundle a rule with high benefits and low costs 
with other rules it wishes to pursue that, standing alone, would not meet a cost-
benefit criterion. Say, for example, that a regulation dealing with reporting re-
quirements promises $1 million in benefits, but at a cost of $5 million—it would 
not, on its own, be cost-benefit justified. However, say the agency is also consid-
ering another regulation restricting air pollution that would yield $100 million 
in benefits and only $50 million in costs. Combining these two rules would result 
in a regulation with $101 million in benefits and $55 million in costs, now passing 
a cost-benefit test. Regulatory-impact analysis also reveals the distributional ef-
fects of rules.
142
 Thus, agencies facing public criticism from certain groups can 




The similar thresholds and criteria set by the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act (UMRA) reinforce all of these incentives.
144
 UMRA directs agencies to assess 
regulatory impacts on state, local, and tribal governments as well as the private 
sector.
145
 In particular, agencies must draft cost-benefit analyses for rules ex-
pected to cost $100 million or more in any one year (and adjusted annually for 
inflation).
146
 The Director of the Office of Management and Budget is charged 
with compiling those analyses and forwarding them to the Congressional 
Budget Office.
147
 While monitoring by OIRA and Congress appears to be super-
ficial, agencies seeking to avoid associated litigation risk have an increased in-




142. Circular A-4 was issued by the Office of Management and Budget in 2003 to provide “guid-
ance to Federal agencies on the development of regulatory analysis.” It states that “regulatory 
analysis should provide a separate description of distributional effects (i.e., how both benefits 
and costs are distributed among subpopulations of particular concern) so that decision mak-
ers can properly consider them along with the effects on economic efficiency.” See Office of 
Mgmt. & Budget, Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis, EXECUTIVE OFF. PRESIDENT 1, 14 (Sept. 
17, 2003), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2D74-ATL6]. 
143. Emery Interview, supra note 75. 
144. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 tit. II, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1538 (2018). 
145. Id. § 1531. 
146. Id. § 1532. 
147. Id. § 1536. 
148. See Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 65, 105 (2015) 
(observing that “OIRA lacks the power to block rules where the agency avoided the UMRA” 
and that “[a]gencies that run afoul of OIRA risk only a negative report to Congress”). 
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For its part, OIRA has attempted to counter such strategic behavior by re-
bundling these rules into one rule now categorized as economically significant. 
In fact, according to a former OIRA branch chief, OIRA once had an informal 
agreement with EPA that the Agency would submit for review rules that cost 
over $25 million per year.
149
 The idea was to deter EPA from tactical splitting to 
avoid the $100 million threshold. More recently, OIRA has issued similarly sen-
sitive guidance addressing President Trump’s two-for-one executive order, Ex-
ecutive Order 13,771.
150
 In particular, the guidance warns agencies not to “artifi-
cially bundl[e] provisions that are not logically connected in a single regulatory 
action.”
151
 OIRA acknowledges that agencies may very well have good reasons 
to package both regulatory and deregulatory provisions into one rulemaking, 
but OIRA also warns that it may ask agencies to split the rules into separate reg-
ulatory and deregulatory provisions absent any discernible rationale.
152
 
To begin to assess whether those agencies subject to OIRA review behave 
differently from those that are not, Table 1 below considers a more general set of 
political features and their relationship with bundling in proposed and final 
rules. For now, consider the first line of the table, which indicates that executive 
agencies include about 4.8 subjects in final rules, and that independent agencies 
include about 3.8 subjects—a difference of about one unit, which is statistically 
significant at any conventional level. This suggests that some aspect of executive 
agencies’ statutory portfolio or oversight environment —most plausibly OIRA 
review—induces them to bundle more often. The same basic pattern exists for 
proposed rules, as shown in the bottom panel of the table. 
  
 
149. See Nou, supra note 6, at 1814 n.328. 
150. See Memorandum from Dominic J. Mancini, Acting Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Af-
fairs, to Regulatory Policy Officers at Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies & Managing & Exec. Dirs. of 
Certain Agencies & Commc’ns (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse
.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2017/M-17-21-OMB.pdf [https://perma.cc/67TQ-WSPT]. 





POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND BUNDLING BEHAVIOR 
  Political Feature No Yes Difference 
Final 
Rules 
Executive Agency 3.78 4.76 −0.99** 
Election Year 4.72 4.64 −0.07* 
Presidential Election Year 4.7 4.63 −0.07 
Republican President 4.77 4.59 −0.19** 
Divided Government 4.59 4.74 −0.15** 
Proposed 
Rules 
Executive Agency 3.36 4.58 −1.21** 
Election Year 4.44 4.45 −0.01 
Presidential Election Year 4.46 4.41 −0.05 
Republican President 4.76 4.14 −0.62** 
Divided Government 4.30 4.54 −0.25** 
Note. ** Denotes a p-value of less than 0.01; * denotes a p-value of less than 0.05.  
b. Congress 
Congress’s main opportunity to veto a regulation arises in the form of the 
Congressional Review Act (CRA).
153
 The Act requires agencies to submit their 
final rules to both houses of Congress and to the Comptroller General.
154
 In turn, 
both houses can pass a fast-tracked joint resolution of disapproval that if signed 
by the President—or passed by two-thirds of both houses over a presidential 
veto—nullifies the regulation under review.
155
 The tool has recently been revived 
by the Trump Administration, after a relatively dormant period in which it op-
erated more as a “soft veto,” exercised through threats.
156
 Importantly for our 
 
153. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2018). Congress, of course, has many other tools at its disposal, includ-
ing appropriations riders and the like. See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 69, 84 (2006). Appropriations riders, in particular, may likewise serve 
many of the functions of a veto, see id. at 69, and deserve further attention in future research. 
154. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A). More specifically, agencies must submit a report that contains the 
rule, a concise general statement describing the rule, and the rule’s proposed effective date. 
Id. 
155. Id. § 801(a)(3)(B), (b)(1). 
156. See Adam M. Finkel & Jason W. Sullivan, A Cost-Benefit Interpretation of the “Substantially Sim-
ilar” Hurdle in the Congressional Review Act: Can OSHA Ever Utter the E-Word (Ergonomics) 
Again?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 707, 728 (2011). Until recently, the CRA had only been used once—
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purposes, the prescribed text
157
 of the joint resolution suggests that Congress 
can only veto entire rules, not just component parts—a reading supported by the 
legislative history.
158
 Furthermore, the resolution’s procedure prohibits any 
amendments, and the final vote is up or down, foreclosing the possibility that 
the rule could be split on the floor.
159
 At the same time, legislators are unable to 
bundle multiple rules into the same joint resolution of disapproval, so promul-
gated rules must be considered separately.
160
 As a result, Congress can only veto 
rules in their entirety. 
On the one hand, holding fixed compliance costs constant,
161
 agencies have 
an incentive to split rules under the CRA in order to decrease the risk that Con-
gress will nullify provisions packaged together with the offending provision. In 
other words, Congress may only dislike one provision in a rule, but nevertheless 
feel compelled to overturn the entire bundled rule given the constraints of the 
CRA. Agencies could thus seek to save those vulnerable provisions by cabining 
them in a separate rulemaking. On the other hand, agencies may also want to 
bundle a number of provisions in order to heighten the consequences of the 
CRA’s all-or-nothing requirement. By packaging highly favorable provisions 
into a rule, an agency could make it less likely for Congress to strike the rule 
 
to overturn the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s ergonomics standard in 
March 2001. See MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30116, CONGRES-
SIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING: AN UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT OF THE CON-
GRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT AFTER A DECADE 6 (2008); see also Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reawakening 
the Congressional Review Act, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 187, 190 (2018) (noting that the CRA 
has been used under the Trump Administration to veto fifteen regulations from the last year 
of the Obama Presidency alone). 
157. 5 U.S.C. § 802(a) (“‘That Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the _____ relating to 
_____, and such rule shall have no force or effect.’ (The blank spaces being appropriately 
filled in).”). 
158. See Morton Rosenberg, Whatever Happened to Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking?: A 
Brief Overview, Assessment, and Proposal for Reform, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1051, 1066 (1999) (con-
cluding that “the statutory structure and legislative history of the review provision strongly 
indicates that Congress intended the process to focus on submitted rules as a whole, and not 
to allow veto of individual parts”). 
159. Id. at 1065. 
160. See Larkin, supra note 156, at 251 (noting proposed legislative amendments “allowing Con-
gress to bundle more than one rule into a joint resolution of disapproval rather than consider 
them one at a time”). 
161. For example, all agencies submitting rules under the CRA must prepare the same standard-
ized form with an attachment, as appropriate, providing a concise statement of the rule. See 




down at all—especially since the CRA does not allow agencies to promulgate any 
substantially similar rules once nullified.
162
 
To explore the possibility that disagreement between the branches might af-
fect bundling behavior, turn again to Table 1. One would generally expect the 
most pronounced effect of the CRA to occur during times of divided govern-
ment, when one party controls at least one house of Congress and the other party 
controls the Presidency. However, divided government does not seem to influ-
ence greatly the extent of bundling. For final rules, the number of subjects is 
about the same regardless of divided government, increasing by about 0.15 units 
during divided government; for notices, the number of subjects is greater during 
times of divided government, but likewise only modestly so, increasing by about 
0.25 units. This pattern suggests that conflict with Congress at most modestly 
increases bundling by agency officials—owing to the CRA or other congressional 
tools.  
To examine the CRA’s bundling effects more closely, consider that the CRA 
is most effective during transitions to unified government after the White House 
changes parties. By its own terms, the CRA has limited reach—the fast-track 
procedures are available for only sixty days after Congress receives the rule.
163
 
This means that Congress can reach only into recent regulatory history and is 
barred from attacking regulations issued even several months earlier. It may be 
in this narrow window only—when Congress and the President both oppose 
regulations recently issued by a President of the opposing party—that one is 
most likely to find effective congressional opposition.  
The rules most likely to be subject to these effects, therefore, are those issued 
in the final months of a presidential administration, particularly the “midnight” 
period after the presidential election but before the inauguration of the next 
President, especially one from the opposing party.
164
 However, as reported in 
Table 2, if one examines notices and rules issued in the last November, Decem-
ber, and January of the Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama Administrations, 
and compares bundling to the notices and rules issued in those same months of 
the year prior, one does not in fact see notable changes in bundling behavior. 
This suggests that the modest effects noted above may derive from agency con-
 
162. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2). 
163. Id. § 802(a). 
164. See Stiglitz, supra note 78, at 137. While it is true that rules before this period could be subject 
to disapproval under the CRA, the November elections would provide more certainty as to 
the relevant political dynamics that would make disapproval more or less likely. 
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Final Rules 4.70 4.90 −0.19 
Proposed Rules 4.24 4.43 −0.18 
Note. For the purposes of this table, the “midnight” period is the time from the final November to 
the following January 20 of the second terms of Presidents Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama. 
The comparison period consists of those months, one year earlier in those administrations. The 
differences in bundling are not close to statistically significant for either proposed or final rules. 
 
More generally, there is only tentative evidence that political factors drive 
bundling behavior. The results suggest that elections may modestly drive down 
bundling behavior for some rules. This is evident from the “election year” rows 
in Table 1, which compare years with a congressional election against odd years. 
These “election years” include all years with a congressional election, regardless 
of whether there is a presidential election or not. In election years, we see a slight 
downtick in bundling behavior, at least for final rules. In those years with a pres-
idential election, however, there are no significantly discernable effects. These 
results may reflect the increased incentives of those running for Congress to 
highlight pending regulatory issues they regard as unpopular—a dynamic which 
would also tend to discourage administrations from pressing controversial reg-
ulatory issues during election years. Overall, these preliminary exercises suggest 
that congressional opposition and political salience may modestly influence 
agency bundling behavior. Future research might consider other measures of 
congressional threat to agencies as well as the differential impact of oversight on 
various categories of rules and agencies. 
 
165. For example, the statutes that occupy agencies’ attention may happen to be different during 
periods of divided government than those of unified government, for reasons entirely apart 




Finally, agency actions are subject to oversight by the courts, which can bun-
dle and split regulations during litigation and in the remedial phase. During lit-
igation, aggrieved parties can move to consolidate or coordinate judicial review 
of separate regulations, or courts can sua sponte issue orders to do so. These 
“batching” decisions are an exercise of courts’ powers to manage multiple law-
suits sharing common questions of law or fact.
166 
They amount to the judicial 
ability to bundle or split rules under the auspices of a single case to review. 
In the remedial phase, courts can vacate rules as a whole or simply sever in-
dividual provisions found to be illegal. To make this decision, courts usually ap-
ply a two-part test. First, they will ask whether the agency would have promul-
gated the rule even without the unlawful provision.
167
 If they determine the 
agency would have, then they will ask whether the remainder of the rule would 
still be operative.
168
 On remand, the action taken by the agency with respect to 
that rule must comply with the court’s remedial decision. For instance, if the 
agency addresses a provision that the court had previously vacated and severed 
from the remainder of the rule, the provision may stand alone in the renewed 
effort, effectuating a form of splitting. Alternatively, a reviewing court might de-
termine that the agency has neglected a dimension of the problem. On remand, 
agencies may decide to address those additional issues in a single rulemaking 
that might otherwise have been treated separately.
169
 
How agencies will behave in anticipation of judicial review is ambiguous as 
a matter of theory. More judicial scrutiny could lead to more bundling, which 
might help to obscure agency policy innovations. It may be harder for comment-
ers, litigants, and judges to parse problematic parts of a rule that are bundled 
with many unproblematic parts. Likewise, to the extent various issues addressed 
in a rule appear interdependent, courts may be reluctant to meddle with any sin-
 
166. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a)(1)-(2) (permitting courts to “join for hearing or trial any or all mat-
ters at issue in the actions” and “consolidate the actions” if the “actions before the court in-
volve a common question of law or fact”). The Ninth Circuit has designed rules to promote 
efficiency by “‘batching’ . . . appeals that implicate analogous questions or similar legislation 
before one argument panel and designating ‘lead cases’ in which the panel opinion would 
affect a group of subsequent matters presenting a common issue.” Carl Tobias, Fourth Circuit 
Publication Practices, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1733, 1754 (2005) (citing NINTH CIRCUIT EVALU-
ATION COMM., INTERIM REPORT 8-16 (Mar. 2000)). 
167. See Charles W. Tyler & E. Donald Elliott, Administrative Severability Clauses, 124 YALE L.J. 2286, 
2296 (2015). 
168. See id. Sometimes, agencies themselves include severability clauses to help inform the court’s 
analysis, but the practice is uncommon. Id. at 2291. 
169. See infra notes 243-247 and accompanying text. 
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gle provision of the rule. Such dynamics would plausibly lead agencies to bundle 
issues more often when they face the possibility of an antagonistic court. That 
said, the relationship between agency bundling and judicial review could also 
run the opposite way: agencies may bundle less under more scrutiny. For in-
stance, if courts recognize the act of bundling itself as a potential foul, thus in-
creasing the odds of a court setting aside a rule on arbitrariness or other 
grounds,
170
 then agencies might decrease bundling in response. Put differently, 
more forceful judicial policing could lead to more rule splitting by litigation-
averse agencies. 
By way of preliminary examination, consider the following measure of judi-
cial scrutiny: the extent to which there is preference divergence based on the 
partisan identity of the judge’s nominating party.
171
 The composition of the D.C. 
Circuit is most relevant, as that circuit has the greatest focus on administrative 
law matters.
172
 Moreover, because challenges to agencies’ rules almost never 
reach the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit is in all likelihood the final resting 
place for administrative controversies.
173
 To produce the measure of preference 
divergence, we first determine the proportion of active judges in a given year on 
the D.C. Circuit who were appointed by a Republican President.
174
 During Dem-
ocratic regimes, we use this quantity as a metric of judicial-preference diver-
gence; during Republican regimes, we use one minus this quantity as the rele-
vant metric. Thus, larger figures reflect a larger number of D.C. Circuit judges 
appointed by a President of the opposite party from the sitting President. 
 
170. See infra Section III.B.3. 
171. There is a robust debate on the appropriate method for measuring judicial preferences. See 
Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How Should We Measure It?, 
29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133 (2009). Compare, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
RATIONAL CHOICE (2013) (taking a law and economics approach), with Adam Bonica & Maya 
Sen, A Common-Space Scaling of the American Judiciary and Legal Profession, 25 POL. ANALYSIS 
114 (2017) (using a scaling methodology). Future empirical work should extend the work here 
using alternative measures of judicial ideology. 
172. See John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 375, 376-77 (2006). 
173. Cf. Adam Feldman, Looking Back to Make Sense of the Court’s (Relatively) Light Workload, EM-
PIRICAL SCOTUS (Jan. 9, 2018), https://empiricalscotus.com/2018/01/09/light-workload 
[https://perma.cc/FGR8-V4AT] (discussing the low number of cases actually decided each 
term by the Court). 
174. We calculate this quantity based on biographical data from the Federal Judicial Center. See 




According to this measure, judicial scrutiny tends to be relatively high during 
the first term of an administration, before the sitting President has had an op-
portunity to appoint sympathetic judges to the court. During the first terms of 
Presidents George W. Bush, Obama, and Trump, for example, the average judi-
cial scrutiny score is 0.62, indicating that almost two-thirds of the active judges 
on the circuit were appointed by a President of the opposing political party. By 
comparison, the average score during the second terms is 0.37, indicating that in 
their second terms Presidents face judges appointed by a President of the oppos-
ing party closer to one-third of the time.
175
 
The question of interest is whether agency bundling increases, decreases, or 
is unaffected by changes in judicial scrutiny. Perhaps surprisingly, our initial re-
sults suggest that judicial-preference divergence is unrelated to bundling behav-
ior, indicating that other regulatory actors may be more significant. The correla-
tion between judicial scrutiny and bundling is virtually zero.
176
 Moreover, 
decomposing the regulatory actions along various dimensions results in the 
same basic finding that no influence persists. There seems to be no relationship, 
that is, between judicial scrutiny and bundling for proposed and final rules by 
executive and independent agencies. While other measures of judicial scrutiny 
should be considered, these initial results may suggest that other institutional 
monitors like the President and Congress are stronger motivators of bundling 
behavior than the courts. 
There are several potential explanations for these results. First, the splitting 
incentives described above may operate on some rules and the bundling incen-
tives described above may operate on other rules, combining to an essentially 
null effect on average. In this scenario, judicial scrutiny does have significant ef-
fects on bundling behavior, but the effects offset each other in the data. Second, 
it is also possible that courts do not police this question of bundling as assidu-
 
175. To provide context for these numbers, consider that the D.C. Circuit currently has eleven seats 
for active judges. The data indicate that Presidents begin their terms with about seven judges 
appointed by the opposing party, and end with about four judges appointed by the opposing 
party, after three judges  appointed by the opposing party vacate their seats for various rea-
sons. 
176. Specifically, the correlation between the two measures is 0.007, and it is not significant at the 
conventional level even with over fifty thousand observations. More sophisticated examina-
tions that look within presidential administrations or within agencies show the same pattern: 
judicial scrutiny bears almost no relationship to bundling behavior, on average. See Jennifer 
Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz, Bundling Supplementary Materials (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with authors). Of course, these null results may reflect heterogeneous effects: scrutiny 
may increase bundling for some types of rules and decrease it for other types of rules, produc-
ing, on average, an effect that approaches zero. Such explanations call for further attention 
and investigation. But to a first approximation, there does not appear to be any relationship 
between this measure of judicial scrutiny and our maintained measure of agency bundling. 
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ously as they might.
177
 Finally, it may be that agencies do not much heed court 
composition for a variety of reasons. For instance, agencies are unlikely to be able 
to predict the partisan composition of their particular judicial panels. Many 
panel assignments are random or otherwise influenced by factors outside the lit-
igants’ control.
178
 It is therefore difficult for agencies to structure their rulemak-
ing behavior in anticipation of a particular set of judges. Moreover, only a highly 
limited proportion of agency rules are subject to litigation, and even then the 
risks of such litigation are not always predictable ex ante.
179
 The remedies may 
also not be clear in advance—courts often exercise their equitable discretion in 
deciding whether to use vacatur as a judicial remedy.
180
 
The standards that courts use to bundle and split rules during litigation are 
also murky. The D.C. Circuit distinguishes between consolidated and coordi-
nated cases, which result in either a single opinion or multiple judicial opinions, 
respectively.
181
 The court does not, however, provide clear guidance on how 
 
177. See infra Section III.B.3. 
178. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1009 (2005) 
(“In the Courts of Appeals, panels are the product of random draws of three among a larger 
set of members of the court.”). But see Adam S. Chilton & Marin K. Levy, Challenging the 
Randomness of Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 38 
(2015) (finding “evidence that panels are nonrandom in four circuits: the D.C. Circuit, the 
Second Circuit, the Eighth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit”); Marin K. Levy, Panel Assignment 
in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 65, 81 (2017) (finding that courts did not 
employ strictly random panel assignments during the time period of the study). 
179. See Raso, supra note 148, at 89, 127. 
180. See Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Adminis-
trative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 323 (2003) (describing “a variety of situations in which courts 
have continued to adhere to the kind of flexibility that is characteristic of traditional equitable 
discretion” when deciding whether or not to vacate a rule after remand). 
181. Consolidated cases in the D.C. Circuit are “treated as one appeal for most purposes” in that 
they “follow a single briefing schedule, they are assigned for hearing on the same day before 
the same panel, argument time is allotted to the cases as a group, and they are decided at the 
same time.” Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR D.C. CIR. 24 
(July 2, 2018) https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL%20 
-%20RPP%20-%20Handbook%202006%20Rev%202007/$FILE/HandbookJuly2018WITH
TOCLINKS.pdf [https://perma.cc/GLU9-5QL6]. D.C. Circuit internal procedural rules also 
provide, however, that even after a case is consolidated, individual litigants still maintain the 
ability to file separate motions. Id. Consolidation, in other words, yields a single judicial opin-
ion informed by a single set of briefs and oral arguments. Coordinated cases, by contrast, 
result in separate judicial opinions informed by separate briefs; they are still heard, however, 
before the same judicial panel. See Gregory E. Wannier, How Many Suits Is Too Many? Consol-
idation and Coordination Possibilities in EPA Climate Litigation, CLIMATE L. BLOG (Oct. 22, 
2010), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2010/10/22/how-many-suits-is-too 
-many-consolidation-and-coordination-possibilities-in-epa-climate-litigation [https://
perma.cc/M39S-Q4N5] (“Case coordination involves hearing multiple cases before the same 
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judges should choose one approach over the other, leaving it instead to their 
managerial discretion. To illustrate what can be at stake, return again to the 
Obama EPA’s greenhouse-gas regulations. Recall that EPA had initially opened 
a single rulemaking docket, but then issued four separate rules dealing with car-
bon dioxide. The Endangerment Finding determined that carbon dioxide en-
dangered “public health and welfare.”
182
 The Tailpipe Rule set emission stand-
ards for cars and light trucks.
183
 The Triggering Rule determined that the Clean 
Air Act required major stationary sources to obtain construction and operating 
permits.
184




A coalition of businesses, interest groups, and U.S. Representatives filed a 
motion to coordinate review of all four rules before the same judicial panel.
186
 In 
their view, “the cases [were] substantively interrelated so as to ‘amount[] to a 
single policy approach’”—evidenced by EPA’s own concession that the rules are 
“related.”
187
 These industry groups also characterized EPA’s opposition to their 
motion as an attempt to dismiss their challenges based on standing principles, 
particularly dealing with injury-in-fact and causation. Separate judicial review, 
the industry groups argued, “could result in an attempt to call for ‘a more ap-




panel, with a goal of yielding complementary decisions in cases where challenges cover related 
activities.”). 
182. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496; 66496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. ch. 1); see 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2018). 
183. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Econ-
omy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600; 
49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536, 537, 538). 
184. Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean 
Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17004 (Apr. 2, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 50, 51, 70, 71). 
185. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 31514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71). 
186. See Wannier, supra note 181. 
187. More specifically, EPA’s argument was that “taken together . . . [these rules] will subject 
[greenhouse gases (GHGs)] emitted from stationary sources to [Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD)] requirements, and limit[] the applicability of PSD requirements to 
GHG sources on a phased-in basis.” Id. (first and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Ac-
tion to Ensure Authority to Issue Permits Under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration 
Program to Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Finding of Substantial Inadequacy and 
SIP Call, 75 Fed. Reg. 53892 (proposed Sept. 2, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52)). 
188. Id. (citing Motion for Coordination of Related Cases at 16-19, Coal. for Responsible Regula-
tion, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 10-1131)). 
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potential motivation for their motion may have been the hope that the more le-
gally tenuous and politically controversial aspects of the Triggering and Tailor-
ing Rules would bring down the Endangerment Finding with it. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, EPA, as well as a coalition of nineteen states and the 
City of New York, filed a motion in opposition to coordination. While conceding 
that the Timing and Tailoring Rules were interrelated enough to warrant con-
solidation (not mere coordination), the motion argued that combining review 
of the Endangerment Finding and Tailpipe Rule would confuse courts with dif-
ferent administrative records and “entirely separate” legal questions.
189
 EPA also 
pointed out that D.C. Circuit rules allowed petitioners to use evidence outside 
the administrative record to establish standing, thus mitigating any justiciability 
concerns.
190
 By opposing coordination, EPA was likely hedging its bets. Even if 
the Agency met one judicial panel hostile to its efforts to address climate change, 
it might still be able to salvage parts of its program before another, friendlier 
panel. 
i i i .  implications 
This Part takes a step back to consider the phenomenon of regulatory bun-
dling in terms of the rulemaking process. After reflecting upon the role of bun-
dling during notice and comment, the next Section considers the broader impli-
cations of regulatory bundling for political monitors and the courts. If the 
phenomenon derives from the influence of narrow special interests, then tools 
like the single-subject rule or a line-item veto may be appropriate. Yet even if it 
does not, revised doctrines of judicial review may nonetheless be wise to preserve 
the value of public participation. At the same time, regulatory bundling can yield 
benefits. The normative desirability of these general reforms requires further 
empirical analysis or a case-by-case approach attuned to the specific merits of a 
particular bundling decision. While such tasks are beyond this Article’s scope, it 
will still explore factors that may help inform such work and identify more spe-
cific avenues for potential study. 
 
189. Id. (quoting Respondent’s Opposition to Motion for Coordination of Cases and Cross-Mo-
tion for Consolidation of Consolidated Case No. 10-1131 with Consolidated Case No. 10-1073 




A. Regulatory Process 
Notice-and-comment rulemaking, as its name suggests, requires agencies to 
give notice of a proposed rule in the Federal Register and then provide parties 
with an opportunity to submit comments.
191
 The agency must base the rulemak-
ing upon consideration of those comments and include a statement of basis and 
purpose in the final rule adopted.
192
 Final rules adopted according to this proce-
dure are generally considered legally binding.
193
 On the one hand, public com-
ments can improve regulations by allowing information gathering, spurring po-
litical monitoring, and fostering public deliberation.
194
 On the other hand, the 
process can also facilitate capture by special-interest groups, as well as politicize 




191. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018). 
192. Id. § 553(c). 
193. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 476-77 (2013). 
194. See Michael A. Livermore et al., Computationally Assisted Regulatory Participation, 93 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 977, 983-87 (2018). 
195. See Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Tailored Participation: Modernizing the APA Rulemaking Procedures, 
12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 321, 330-38 (2009). 
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FIGURE 4. 
HISTOGRAMS OF BUNDLING SUBJECTS 
 
 
To understand better how this process may influence bundling, consider Fig-
ure 4 above, which displays a histogram of the number of subjects in proposed 
and final rules. As is evident from the figure, the number of subjects is right-
skewed, with many rules listing very few subjects, and a distinct minority of 
rules listing a large number of subjects. Interestingly, final rules tend to contain 
more subjects than proposed rules; the average number of subjects in a proposed 
rule is 4.4, and the corresponding average for final rules is 4.7. This observation 
may suggest that agencies are increasing bundling through the notice-and-com-
ment process—perhaps a kind of “bundling creep” whereby agencies include ad-
ditional issues in a final rule. To examine this possibility, consider the evolution 
of bundling within rulemaking efforts.
196
 We built a software program to match 
 
196. Note that earlier we examined the average number of subjects in proposed and final rules 
within agencies and found those correlations to be strong—agencies that list many subjects in 
their proposed rules also do so in final rules. Here, we look within rulemaking efforts. 
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proposed rules with final rules, thereby allowing us to examine how bundling 
changes across a rule’s life cycle. Over the series, we identified almost 14,500 
matches between proposed and final rules, accounting for over three-quarters of 
all proposed rules. The remaining rules may be unmatched for a number of rea-
sons, including the fact that agencies frequently withdraw proposed rules or 




BUNDLING IN PROPOSED AND FINAL RULES 
 
 
197. For the later parts of the series, many proposed rules will not have completed the rulemaking 
process—a rule proposed in 2017, for example, is quite likely not to have been finalized in our 
dataset; the “orphan” rate (rate of abandoned proposed rules) in 2017 is more than double the 
rate at the start of the series. In other cases, our algorithm may miss references to proposed 
rules in the final rules, for instance, because the agency used a nonstandard citation or rec-
orded the citation to the proposed rule incorrectly. However, we suspect such instances are 
rare and, more importantly, essentially random. The algorithm works by searching final rules 
for references to proposed rules, and this may also lead to “false” matches, if, for example, a 
final rule cites distinct but perhaps related regulatory efforts. Based on an inspection of a ran-
dom subset of matches, however, we believe the number of false matches to be relatively small 
and, as above, to operate mainly to introduce an element of noise but not bias. 
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Examining the evolution of bundling within a rulemaking effort reveals sev-
eral features. First, most rules that start out with extensive bundling finish with 
extensive bundling. The correlation between the number of subjects in proposed 
and final rules is strongly positive at 0.80. Figure 5 plots the number of subjects 
in the final rule against the number of subjects in the matched proposed rule. As 
is shown by the darker shading, which indicates a density of rules, most rules 
fall along the line of perfect correspondence. Second, consistent with the find-
ings above, when rules change the number of subjects in a rulemaking effort, 
they tend to increase them. This is also evident from Figure 5, which shows a 
greater density of rules above the line of correspondence than below it. 
Quantitatively, fully one-quarter of rules increase the number of subjects 
listed during the rulemaking process. Almost seven in ten rules maintain the ex-
act number of subjects throughout the process (sixty-nine percent); and fewer 
than one in ten decreases the number of subjects from proposed to final rule (six 
percent).
198
 As an initial matter, it is possible these findings reflect agency coding 
practices rather than substantive changes in the regulatory language—a kind of 
measurement error. Because proposed rules are lower stakes than final rules, rule 
writers may not pay much attention to ensuring coding accuracy at the proposal 
stage.
199
 Before finalizing rules, however, agencies may invest more time and ef-
fort in ensuring that the list of subjects is complete, as would the Office of the 
Federal Register during review.
200
 Therefore, the increase in subjects at the final-
rule stage may simply reflect more careful coding efforts. Mitigating this possi-
bility, however, is the fact that public commenters can criticize agencies for in-
complete lists of subjects.
201
 Such public scrutiny may help encourage agencies 
to publish complete subject lists at the proposal stage too. 
If so, the results above likely reflect the incentives generated by the notice-
and-comment process in favor of more bundling at the final-rule stage. Com-
menters might raise issues not initially contemplated by the agency, compelling 
agency officials to address them more specifically in the final rule. While agencies 
are constrained by the judicial requirement to ensure that final rules are a “logical 
 
198. Also note that, on average, agencies increase the number of subjects from proposed to final 
rule by almost a quarter unit (0.22). 
199. See Emery Interview, supra note 75. Final rules, unlike proposed rules, are legally binding and 
subject to litigation as final agency action. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2018). 
200. See Swidal Interview, supra note 41. 
201. See, e.g., Letter from Emily Kirkpatrick, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Council of Teachers of English, to 
Jennifer Bell-Ellwanger, Dir. of Policy & Program Studies Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 3 (Nov. 
17, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2017-OS-0078-1354 [https://
perma.cc/J4QV-FUU8] (suggesting that the Department of Education “add ‘literacy’ to the 
list of subjects” covered by a particular proposal). 
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outgrowth” of proposed rules, the requirement has limited bite in practice.
202
 As 
a result, agencies may address more issues in the final rule to appease stakehold-
ers who possess credible means of delaying or killing the regulatory effort. 
Indeed, regulated entities could seek bundling for many reasons. Bundled 
rules facilitate predictability and planning by simultaneously imposing various 
regulatory obligations. Businesses can then invest in any necessary compliance 
technology all at once, instead of on an inefficient, piecemeal basis. Bundled rules 
could also be attractive to interest groups with wide-ranging agendas but narrow 
windows of opportunity to capture a regulatory drafter. Successful lobbyists 
might extract packages of perks and rewards as the opportunity arises. The re-
volving door, through which exiting regulators get hired by the regulated and 
vice versa, may also facilitate mutually beneficial relationships between agency 
insiders and industry members.
203
 These relationships may result in logrolling 
between repeat players. Agency staffers could trade off regulatory favors between 
regulations at different points in time, thus resulting in rules with more provi-
sions. 
B. Innovative Controls 
Regulatory bundling also offers new perspectives on the kinds of controls 
available to agency monitors. While the standard account usually contemplates 
the President, Congress, and the courts striking down entire regulations, the lens 
offered here opens up new possibilities for the kinds of tools monitors can use 
to exercise oversight. As discussed below, the normative desirability of bundling 
and splitting remains contested and uncertain. The net effects require further 
empirical examination, the conclusions of which should help inform whether 
 
202. See Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1287 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting, in a discussion of the logi-
cal-outgrowth doctrine, that “the fact that a final rule varies from a proposal, even substan-
tially, does not automatically void the regulations”); Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d 
1098, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985) (parsing the logical-outgrowth analysis as requiring that “in the 
final analysis each case ‘must turn on how well the notice that the agency gave serves the 
policies underlying the notice requirement’” (quoting Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task 
Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1983))); Small Refiner Lead, 705 F.2d at 548-49 
(characterizing the logical-outgrowth requirement merely to demand that a party “should 
have anticipated that such a requirement might be imposed”); cf. Int’l Union, United Mine 
Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 F.3d 1250, 1259-60 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(declaring that a final rule is not a “logical outgrowth” if it “is a brand new rule” or “where 
interested parties would have had to ‘divine [the Agency’s] unspoken thoughts’” (alteration 
in original) (quoting Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d 1280, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 2000))). 
203. For a nuanced discussion of these dynamics, see Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door, 90 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265 (2015). 
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and the extent to which these reforms should be adopted. In anticipation of that 
work, this Section explores the tools that various parties could employ to en-
courage or constrain regulatory bundling. In doing so, the Section also sheds 
light on how current institutional practices may be influencing bundling deci-
sions. 
1. Line-Item Vetoes 
Just as the line-item veto can be used to reduce the scope of bundled statutes, 
so, too, can it be used to pare back bundled regulations. The line-item veto has 
traditionally been understood as the ability of executive officials to cancel or nul-
lify specific provisions of bills before signing them.
204
 While the mechanism has 
been well studied in the statutory context,
205
 its implications for the regulatory 
state have gone largely unexplored. One explanation may be the relatively mys-
terious nature of the OIRA review process. Few recognize, for example, that 
OIRA exercises a form of the line-item veto for regulations.
206
 After agencies 
submit their proposed and final rules for review, OIRA has the ability to cross 
out specific provisions and broader language unrelated to specific regulatory 
costs or benefits.
207
 Many have criticized this practice as legally illegitimate or 




204. See Indridi H. Indridason, Executive Veto Power and Credit Claiming: Comparing the Effects of 
the Line-Item Veto and the Package Veto, 146 PUB. CHOICE 375, 375 (2011). 
205. See, e.g., Glenn Abney & Thomas P. Lauth, The Line-Item Veto in the States: An Instrument for 
Fiscal Restraint or an Instrument for Partisanship?, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 372 (1985); John R. 
Carter & David Schap, Line-Item Veto: Where Is Thy Sting?, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 103 (1990); 
James A. Dearden & Thomas A. Husted, Do Governors Get What They Want?: An Alternative 
Examination of the Line-Item Veto, 77 PUB. CHOICE 707 (1993); James J. Gosling, Wisconsin 
Item-Veto Lessons, 46 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 292 (1986); Pat Thompson & Steven R. Boyd, Use of 
the Item Veto in Texas, 1940-1990, 26 ST. & LOC. GOV’T. REV. 38 (1994). 
206. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 137, at 1839 (observing that “the role of OIRA and the nature of the 
OIRA process remain poorly understood”). One exception is Steven Croley who has observed 
that “whereas the president lacks the ability to veto selective pieces of legislation, he enjoys a 
‘line-item veto,’ so to speak, of agencies’ regulatory initiatives.” See Steven P. Croley, REGU-
LATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 97 
(2008). 
207. See Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship Between the 
Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 344 (2014) (describing 
how OIRA “offered line-by-line edits of regulatory proposals”). This ability is referred to as 
the “narrative veto” in the statutory context. See, e.g., Abney Glenn & Thomas P. Lauth, Gu-
bernatorial Use of the Item Veto for Narrative Deletion, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 492 (2002). 
208. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, A Place for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise with Pres-
idential Power, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2019, 2045 (2015). 
regulatory bundling 
1225 
Appreciating regulatory bundling, however, allows for a more nuanced as-
sessment of the OIRA process. One hypothesis in the statutory context is that 
the line-item veto is a salutary means for the President to cut back on logrolling 
and pork-barrel politics.
209
 Indeed, this is often the rationale for OIRA review 
itself—a means for a nationally conscious Executive to check mission-oriented 
agencies who impose narrow regulatory costs.
210
 A competing hypothesis is that 
the line-item veto results in an increase in special-interest bills.
211
 The possibility 
of a veto itself, that is, can induce the proposer to include more pork-barrel pro-
visions in the hopes that some survive the veto threat. In fact, some have ob-
served this practice in the regulatory context. Agencies will often add pro-
visions to draft rules as bargaining chips that “would be available” for agencies 
“to give away” or use to negotiate during OIRA review in order to protect what 
they perceive as the most important provisions of a rule.
212
 
Most empirical work in the legislative context suggests that the line-item 
veto produces either no discernible effect
213
 or an effect only under certain con-
ditions, such as divided government.
214
 A natural question, then, is whether 
these findings extend to the administrative state and how legislative, presiden-
tial, and agency preferences interact in the shadow of OIRA’s line-item veto. 
Such evaluations could help inform a more meaningful debate about potential 
reforms to the OIRA process. This debate, for example, might raise inquiries 
analogous to those asked in the legislative arena. Instead of a line-item veto, for 
example, perhaps OIRA should only be granted a “package veto” over the entire 
regulation, rather than its parts.
215
 Would doing so result in a more productive 
set of agency-White House dynamics or only more delay and ossification? These 
 
209. See, e.g., Glen O. Robinson, Public Choice Speculations on the Item Veto, 74 VA. L. REV. 403, 405 
(1988). 
210. See, e.g., Croley, supra note 140, at 873-76; Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 2245, 2339-41 (2001). 
211. See Robinson, supra note 209, at 414. 
212. See Stuart Shapiro, The Role of Procedural Controls in OSHA’s Ergonomics Rulemaking, 67 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 688, 693 (2007). 
213. See Carter & Schap, supra note 205; Gosling, supra note 205; Indridason, supra note 204; Cath-
erine C. Reese, The Line-Item Veto in Practice in Ten Southern States, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 510 
(1997); Thompson & Boyd, supra note 205.  
214. See Adam R. Brown, The Item Veto’s Sting, 12 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 183 (2012); Dearden & 
Husted, supra note 205; cf. Abney & Lauth, supra note 205 (discussing the increased use of the 
line-item veto in periods of divided government). 
215. See Indridason, supra note 204, at 376. 
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perspectives also open up other institutional possibilities such as a line-item con-
gressional veto, which would likely require an amendment to the Congressional 
Review Act. 
2. Single-Subject Rules 
Another potential innovation plainly relevant to regulatory bundling is a sin-
gle-subject rule for the administrative state. Single-subject rules, as their name 
suggests, traditionally require a lawmaking body to address only a single “sub-
ject” per legislative bill.
216
 Many state constitutions, for instance, impose such a 
rule on state legislatures.
217
 The rationale varies from location to location, but 
tends to be rooted in one of several concerns.
 
The dominant one is that a piece 
of legislation with multiple subjects might represent logrolling in which no in-
dividual provision enjoys majority support.
218
 Say a piece of legislation that con-
tains issue A does not have majority support, so the drafters join issue B to the 
bill. If a sufficient number of legislators favor issue B without strongly disfavor-
ing issue A, the bill with both A and B will receive majority support. It might be, 
however, that neither issue A nor issue B enjoys majority support on its own, but 
that both issues become law by virtue of bundling. In this sense, a persistent fear 
is that logrolling works for the benefit of special-interest groups and at the ex-
pense of the general public. 
Another fear is that allowing a piece of legislation to address multiple sub-
jects may increase the size of government beyond the optimal level. Bundling 
 
216. See Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 
805 (2006). 
217. Id. at 806; see also Rachael Downey et al., A Survey of the Single Subject Rule as Applied to 
Statewide Initiatives, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 579 (2003) (surveying the application of the 
single-subject rule to initiatives in select states); Martha J. Dragich, State Constitutional Re-
strictions on Legislative Procedure: Rethinking the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single Subject, and 
Clear Title Challenges, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 103, 103-04 (2001) (citing the single-subject rule 
as an example of a procedural limitation imposed by a state constitution on the legislature); 
John G. Matsusaka & Richard L. Hasen, Aggressive Enforcement of the Single Subject Rule, 9 
ELECTION L.J. 399 (2010) (discussing criticisms of aggressive enforcement of the single-sub-
ject rule); Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative 
Compliance and Judicial Enforcement, 17 PUBLIUS 91 (1987) (citing single-subject rules as an 
example of a state-level constitutional procedural limitation on state legislature); Jeffrey Gray 
Knowles, Note, Enforcing the One-Subject Rule: The Case for a Subject Veto, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 
563, 563 (1986) (discussing the use of a one-subject rule to reduce “pork barrel” legislation); 
Courtney Paige Odishaw, Note, Curbing Legislative Chaos: Executive Choice or Congressional 
Responsibility, 74 IOWA L. REV. 227, 229 (1988) (citing single-subject rules as one innovative 
solution to pork-barreling at the state level). 
218. See Gilbert, supra note 216, at 813-14. 
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allows measures to enter law that, standing alone, would not become law, argu-
ably leading to excessive legislation. Those opposed to the growth of govern-
ment may thus seek a single-subject rule. This position, of course, relies on some 
notion of the “optimal” size of government, a question about which there is no 
clear consensus.
219
 Finally, another related concern is that bundling diminishes 
political accountability. Returning to our example with issues A and B, it is chal-
lenging for observers—and in particular for voters—to know whether their rep-
resentatives supported issue A or B. If issue B, say, turns out to harm voters’ 
interests, then the representative might plausibly defend himself by saying that 
he, too, opposed issue B, but ultimately voted for the bill to win passage for issue 
A. That statement may or may not be true and is difficult for the voter to evalu-
ate, thus diminishing accountability. 
Similar normative concerns could also motivate a single-subject rule for the 
administrative state. Logrolling within an agency or across agencies could pro-
duce momentum for a regulatory effort that otherwise would stall. Similarly, 
agency staff can attach provisions to rules that have been expedited by a political 
appointee to meet a statutory deadline.
220
 These regulatory riders may escape 
internal scrutiny due to the speed of rulemaking and receive only cursory review 
by an agency head who is distracted by higher-priority components. Concerns 
about the size of government also resonate in the regulatory context, as do 
threats to accountability posed by unelected bureaucrats.
221
 
A rule requiring regulations to deal with one subject at a time could be im-
posed by statute, executive order, or through judicial case law. How to define a 
“subject” is notoriously difficult as a linguistic and conceptual matter, and dif-
ferent institutional actors will likely be informed by different motivating con-
cerns.
222
 Congress, for example, may want to define a “subject” by reference to 
its own legislative bundles. This approach may require agencies to issue regula-
tions under one statutory grant at a time, rather than pursuant to multiple au-
thorities that upset the preferences of a specific enacting Congress. By contrast, 
 
219. For an attempt to answer this question, see Allan H. Meltzer & Scott F. Richard, A Rational 
Theory of the Size of Government, 89 J. POL. ECON. 914 (1981). 
220. See Emery Interview, supra note 75. 
221. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, DESIGN FOR LIBERTY: PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC ADMIN-
ISTRATION, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2011). 
222. See Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single Subject 
Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 687 (2010) (“Logic and language cannot yield a precise defini-
tion of ‘subject.’”); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Initiatives and the New Single Subject Rule, 1 ELEC-
TION L.J. 35, 47 (2002) (“The difficulty of applying the term ‘subject’ in a single subject 
rule . . . is that by its very nature, the permissible content of a ‘subject’ is infinitely and essen-
tially malleable.”). 
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the President may see it as part of his constitutional duty to regulate coherently 
across all of his delegated authority. Thus, he may issue an executive order that 
defines “subject” in ways that allow him to advance his particular priorities or 
claim public credit more effectively.
223
 
Alternatively, instead of specifying what a “subject” entails in advance, any 
of these actors, including the courts, could simply impose a duty to explain why 
a rule is bundled in a particular way. This approach would help mitigate the def-
initional problem, requiring agencies instead to provide a rationale at whatever 
level of generality they deemed appropriate. For example, OIRA’s guidance un-
der Trump’s two-for-one executive order requires agencies to explain how reg-
ulatory provisions are “logically connected.”
224
 OIRA then retains the authority 
to split the regulations as necessary to ensure compliance with the executive or-
der. Courts could similarly require regulatory provisions to be sufficiently related 
and grant varying levels of deference to an agency’s bundling explanation, as 
further discussed below. Because regulatory bundling often requires specialized 
knowledge—for instance, how a program in area A is likely to affect a program 
in area B—courts may not feel institutionally competent to assess the decision de 
novo. 
3. Judicial Review 
Judicial review, then, represents another device that could be used to cali-
brate agencies’ bundling behavior. There are at least two doctrinal vehicles for 
such intervention. 
a. Soft Looks 
Courts can and do police bundling decisions under arbitrariness review.
225
 
This standard—whether or not an agency action is “arbitrary or capricious”—is 
 
223. At the state level, there is also the interesting dynamic of the plural or “unbundled” executive, 
which may result in greater state-agency splitting to align with the interests of separate exec-
utives. See Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1385, 1386-87, 1404 (2008). 
224. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, M-17-21, GUIDANCE IMPLE-
MENTING EXECUTIVE ORDER 13771, TITLED “REDUCING REGULATION AND CONTROLLING REG-
ULATORY COSTS” 15 (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files
/omb/memoranda/2017/M-17-21-OMB.pdf [https://perma.cc/NA6Z-6WXK]. 
225. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018). 
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generally understood as demanding evidence-based explanation.
226
 While 
courts have sometimes described this as “hard look review,” they are also quick 
to emphasize that such review should be “narrow” and not displace the agency’s 
well-considered judgment.
227
 In practice, judges indeed appear to be deferential 
to agencies under the arbitrary and capricious test, especially at the Supreme 
Court
228
—perhaps invoking it only intermittently to ensure that it remains a 
credible threat. 
This general orientation—a “soft” rather than “hard” look, if you will—
seems appropriate when it comes to the review of regulatory bundling. One rea-
son is that bundling can be understood as an agency choice about policy-making 
form, a decision about which courts are generally deferential if the underlying 
statute is otherwise silent.
229
 Agencies also possess the comparative expertise 
necessary to assess the potential benefits and harms of bundling. The practice 
may, for example, lower compliance costs for regulated industries by imposing 
one-time investments in technology. Indeed, this was the sensible rationale pro-
vided by a Department of Health and Human Services final regulation consoli-
dating into one rule what had previously been four proposed and interim final 
rules.
230
 Bundling could also reflect productive and necessary bargaining be-
tween agency actors and political monitors. These factors suggest that courts 
 
226. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE 
L.J. 2, 2 (2009) (“Current conceptions of ‘arbitrary and capricious’ review focus on whether 
agencies have adequately explained their decisions in statutory, factual, scientific, or otherwise 
technocratic terms.”). 
227. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“The 
scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”). 
228. See Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1358, 
1367 (2016) (observing that “agencies have won no less than 92 percent of . . . arbitrariness 
challenges” in the Supreme Court and that “[t]he days of systematically aggressive hard look 
review, as in the D.C. Circuit’s decisions from the 1970s and early 1980s, are mostly behind 
us”). 
229. See NLRB. v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 
II), 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“[T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or by 
individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the admin-
istrative agency.”); Magill, supra note 1, at 1403-05. 
230. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules 
Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Ge-
netic Information Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 5566, 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (“This final rule is 
comprised of four final rules, which have been combined to reduce the impact and number of 
times certain compliance activities need to be undertaken by the regulated entities.”). 
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should act with deference toward an agency’s decisions about its own bundling 
practices. 
At the same time, it is important for courts to continue to use arbitrariness 
review to invalidate particularly troubling instances of bundling that lack suffi-
cient justification. Consider, for example, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in AFL-
CIO v. OSHA,
231
 which struck down OSHA’s Air Contaminants Standard rule. 
The court applied a standard more stringent than arbitrary and capricious review 
due to the underlying statute, but the case nevertheless illustrates an approach 
that we view favorably.
232
 After the initial promulgation of “start-up” standards 
based on already-existing federal requirements,
233
 OSHA had historically man-
aged to issue regulations dealing with only 24 toxic substances, and it had ad-
dressed these substances only one at a time.
234
 In this bundled rulemaking, how-
ever, the Agency decided to attempt to deal with 428 substances all at once. In 
OSHA’s view, “it would take decades to review currently used chemicals and 
OSHA would never be able to keep up with the many chemicals which will be 
newly introduced in the future.”
235
 Further, the OSHA chief stated that by treat-
ing over 400 substances in one regulation, the Agency could “make a 20-year 
leap forward in the level of worker protection in a relatively short time.”
236
 In-
terested parties had only forty-seven days to comment on the entire rule, fol-
lowed by a thirteen-day public hearing.
237
 
The appeals court vacated the regulation due to the Agency’s failure to make 
a separate scientific case for each individual substance’s health risks.
238
 While 
acknowledging that the rulemaking may have been “the only practical way of 
 
231. 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992). 
232. Id. at 970 (“‘Substantial evidence’ is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 
as adequate to support a conclusion.’ Under this test, ‘we must take a “harder look” at OSHA’s 
action than we would if we were reviewing the action under the more deferential arbitrary 
and capricious standard applicable to agencies governed by the Administrative Procedure 
Act.’” (citations omitted) (first quoting Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 
522 (1981); and then quoting Asbestos Info. Ass’n v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 1984))). 
233. Id. at 968; see 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (2018). 
234. AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 971. 
235. Id. (quoting Air Contaminants, 53 Fed. Reg. 20960, 20963 (proposed June 7, 1988) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910)). 




237. AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 969. 
238. Id. at 987. 
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accomplishing a much needed revision,” the court nonetheless expressed skep-
ticism about the Agency’s method for doing so—even accusing the Agency of 
being “misleading” in labelling its regulation as “generic.”
239
 In addition, the 
Agency’s proffered reasons—in particular the need for expediency—were candid, 
but unsupported by the evidentiary record.
240
 The court also complained that 
the Agency’s extreme bundling stymied judicial review.
241
 As a result, the opin-
ion was only able to provide representative problems with the rule and could not 
address each of its flaws.
242
 In this manner, a court was able to police a regulation 
that had bundled provisions in a way that subverted public and judicial moni-
toring. 
Interestingly, arbitrariness review has also been used by courts to set aside 
rules that fail to consider other rules that are closely related. In Spirit of the Sage 
Council v. Norton,
243
 for instance, a district court reviewed two rules issued by 
the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service 
pursuant to the Endangered Species Act. The first rule, the “No Surprises Rule,” 
provided that landowners who submit a habitat conservation plan would not be 
required to expend additional financial resources or accept additional restrictions 
on property use, so long as they abided by the terms of the plan.
244
 A subsequent 
regulation, the “Permit Revocation Rule,” provided that the assurance of “no 
surprises” could be revoked under certain circumstances.
245
 Without identifying 
any substantive deficiencies, the district court held that the two rules were “suf-
ficiently intertwined” and thus remanded the case to FWS so that the Agency 
could jointly consider the related provisions.
246
 After the D.C. Circuit denied 
FWS’s motion for a stay pending appeal, the agencies bundled the rules and so-




239. Id. at 972, 987 (noting that “the new Air Contaminants Standard is an amalgamation of 428 
unrelated substance exposure limits” where “[t]here is little common to this group of diverse 
substances except the fact that OSHA considers them toxic and in need of regulation”). 
240. Id. at 986. 
241. Id. (“OSHA has lumped together substances and affected industries and provided such inad-
equate explanation that it is virtually impossible for a reviewing court to determine if sufficient 
evidence supports the agency’s conclusions.”). 
242. Id. (noting that “[t]he individual substances discussed in this opinion are merely examples of 
what is endemic in the Air Contaminants Standard as a whole”). 
243. 294 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2003), vacated as moot, 411 F.3d 225 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
244. Id. at 77. 
245. Id. at 79. 
246. Id. at 91. 
247. Endangered Species Act Incidental Take Permit Revocation Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 71723 
(Dec. 10, 2004) (amending 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
the yale law journal 128:1174  2019 
1232 
b. Notice and Logical Outgrowth 
Beyond arbitrariness review, courts can also play an important role in ensur-
ing that agencies provide sufficient notice to public commenters, even when they 
bundle. Courts, in other words, can ensure that those who seek to participate in 
a rulemaking are given sufficient warning about an agency’s regulatory pro-
posals.
248
 Recall OSHA’s rulemaking regulating 428 different substances. Dur-
ing litigation, industry groups complained that bundling so many substances 
into a single rule impeded their ability to raise all their concerns.
249
 They com-
plained that too many issues were presented with fewer than fifty days to com-
ment on all of them.
250
 On the facts and statutory background of AFL-CIO v. 
OSHA, the court dismissed this concern.
251
 But one can imagine the adequacy 
of notice playing a more important part in judicial review, especially as agencies 
appear to be bundling at higher rates. 
A related concern stems from the connection between the proposed rule and 
the final rule. If the final rule is so different from the proposed one that it is not 
a “logical outgrowth” of it, then commenters may not have had an adequate op-
portunity to participate in the rulemaking process—they were not sufficiently on 
notice of what the agency might do.
252
 Courts have been using the logical-out-
growth doctrine to police the concern that final rules will be written in ways that 
could not be anticipated by would-be commenters.
253
 The worry is that agencies 
keep their intended rules under wraps while proposing something only tenu-
ously related to what they plan to impose.
254
 This doctrine may thus be another 
tool through which courts police bundling, particularly if agencies tend to in-
crease bundling through the notice-and-comment process. 
*** 
While the above tools are important to consider in the administrative state, 
whether they should be adopted requires further empirical work as to regulatory 
 
248. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018) (requiring a “notice” of proposed rulemaking). 
249. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 969 n.8 (11th Cir. 1992). 
250. See id. at 969 & n.8. 
251. Id. at 969 n.8. 
252. See Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down 
Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 352 
(D.C. Cir. 1981). 
253. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 584 F.3d 1076, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2009). See 
generally Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 856, 899 (2007) (arguing that the logical-outgrowth doctrine has imposed procedural 
burdens on agencies that far exceed the minimal requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 553). 
254. See CSX, 584 F.3d at 1080. 
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bundling’s causes and consequences. One future study might investigate, for ex-
ample, whether OIRA’s line-item veto has in fact resulted in more burdensome 
regulations as a result of the incentive to add costlier provisions for negotiation 
purposes. Such a finding could lend support to the conclusion that OIRA should 
no longer exercise a line-item veto. Other studies might consider whether varia-
tions in bundling across agencies systematically explain rates of public comment 
or the quality of the input offered. If more bundling reduces the amount and 
character of public participation, then one might decide that bundling should be 
constrained. If, however, bundling facilitates more diverse participation and 
higher-quality comments, then it may be salutary. Even if general empirical con-
clusions are possible, case-by-case assessments may nevertheless also be sensible 
given the heterogeneity of rulemaking efforts. Even if one could aggregate the 
effects of regulatory bundling, it nonetheless may be wise to consider the merits 
of the practice in the context of specific rules or subject areas. 
Further work is also needed to assess other possible consequences of regula-
tory bundling. On the one hand, as noted above, regulatory bundling can reflect 
a strategic attempt by an agency to obfuscate or otherwise overwhelm the mon-
itors of a particular rulemaking. The associated concern would be that unelected 
bureaucrats are making policy without democratic accountability or due process 
values like notice and participation. On the other hand, regulatory bundling may 
also have more salutary motivations and consequences. For example, it may re-
flect deliberative compromises between agency actors and members of Congress 
or the White House.
255
 Such deliberation may result in more information, crea-
tive policy making, and public-regarding results. It may also help facilitate rule-
making when parties with unrepresentative or extreme preferences otherwise at-
tempt to block welfare-enhancing regulation. In this sense, bundling can serve 
as a kind of commitment device.
256
 As previously noted, bundled rules could also 
help to decrease compliance costs by allowing regulated entities to comply more 
 
255. Cf. Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 1511 (1992) (providing a “republican” defense of administrative law as a collaborative, 
civic participatory enterprise). 
256. See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, 
AND CONSTRAINTS 88-92 (2000) (describing political constitutions as “commitment” de-
vices). During negotiations over the proposed rule, the inability of an agency to commit to a 
particular deal is a problem that could undo many attempted compromises. For example, an 
agency might attempt to placate an interest group by promising some favored regulatory re-
vision in the future. Yet the interest group may not trust the agency to follow through: after 
all, there might be a change in agency personnel, or a shift in priorities due to exogenous 
events. As a result, the interest group may challenge the immediate rule and thereby delay its 
implementation for years. In response, the agency may bundle the change into the final rule. 
This allows the agency credibly to commit to the revision, thus forestalling any adverse action 
contemplated by the interest group or political actor. 
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efficiently through one-time technological investments. Bundling can also in-
crease predictability and certainty about an agency’s policy choices regarding a 
particular regulatory problem. For all these reasons, a normative appraisal of 
regulatory bundling requires further empirical examination of the aggregate 
consequences of the phenomenon. In the meantime, more case-by-case evalua-
tions of the practice’s trade-offs would also be valuable. 
conclusion 
Administrative agencies can bundle and split their policy-making instru-
ments. This Article has explored how they do so with respect to legislative rules. 
It has identified the concept of regulatory bundling and proposed a way to op-
erationalize it. The empirical analysis suggests that regulatory bundling is an in-
creasingly common phenomenon. At the same time, agency practices vary 
widely—some agencies bundle frequently, others rarely. Most agencies, however, 
appear to bundle more as the rulemaking process unfolds, bundling more issues 
into final rather than proposed rules. These findings raise significant normative 
concerns that may be addressed through a suite of tools novel to the administra-
tive state: single-subject rules, line-item vetoes, and innovative forms of judicial 
review. 
More broadly, this Article has sought to open up further lines of inquiry an-
alogous to those explored by social scientists in the legislative context. Many re-
search questions remain: What aspects of agency variation explain differences in 
bundling behavior? Does regulatory bundling as a whole increase or decrease 
social welfare? Relatedly, has OIRA’s line-item veto resulted in more or less reg-
ulatory costs? While administrative law has long allowed agencies flexibility in 
choosing their policy-making tools, the law’s normative concerns of notice and 
participation demand further scrutiny of how these tools are aggregated and dis-






A. Basic Summary Statistics, 2000-17 
 No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Max. Min. 
Proposed Rules 40823 4.45 3.14 41 0 
Final Rules 18898 4.67 3.54 62 0 
B. Table of Agency Abbreviations 
Abbreviation Agency Name 
AID Agency for International Development 
ATBCB Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board 
CFPB* Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 
CFTC* Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
CNSC Corporation for National and Community Service 
CPSC Consumer Product Safety Commission 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DOC Department of Commerce 
DOD Department of Defense 
DOE Department of Energy 
DOI Department of the Interior 
DOJ Department of Justice 
DOL Department of Labor 
DOS Department of State 
DOT Department of Transportation 
ED Department of Education 
EEOC Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
FCA Farm Credit Administration 
FCC* Federal Communications Commission 
FDIC* Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
FEC Federal Election Commission 
FERC* Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
FHFA* Federal Housing Finance Agency 
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FHFB Federal Housing Finance Board 
FLRA Federal Labor Relations Authority 
FMC* Federal Maritime Commission 
FRB* Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors 
FRTIB Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board 
FTC Federal Trade Commission 
GSA General Services Administration 
HHS Department of Health and Human Services 
HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development 
ITC United States International Trade Commission 
LSC Legal Services Corporation 
MSPB Merit Systems Protection Board 
NARA National Archives and Records Administration 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NCUA National Credit Union Administration 
NFAH National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities 
NIGC National Indian Gaming Commission 
NLRB National Labor Relations Board 
NRC* Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
NSF National Science Foundation 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
OCC* Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
OGE Office of Government Ethics 
OMB Office of Management and Budget 
OPM Office of Personnel Management 
PBGC Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
PRC* Postal Rate Commission 
RRB Railroad Retirement Board 
SBA Small Business Administration 
SEC* Securities and Exchange Commission 
SSA Social Security Administration 
STB Surface Transportation Board 
TRE Department of Treasury 
TVA Tennessee Valley Authority 
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USDA Department of Agriculture 
USPS United States Postal Service 
VA Department of Veterans Affairs 
Note. An asterisk (*) denotes an “independent” agency, as classified in the Paperwork Reduction 
Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2018). “Other” agencies include those agencies with names reported in 
a nonstandard fashion. These agencies often engaged in little rulemaking. 
C. Data Preparation 
The Government Publishing Office (GPO) makes XML files of the Federal 
Register available between the year 2000 and the present.
257
 We downloaded 
those files and, initially, captured all entries in the “Proposed Rules” and “Rules 
and Regulations” sections.
258
 Not all entries in those sections, however, are pro-
posed or final legislative rules. For instance, the Proposed Rules section also con-
tains petitions for rulemakings.
259
 The Rules and Regulations section also in-
cludes “policy statements and interpretations of rules.”
260
 We thus had to screen 
out entries that did not correspond to legislative rules. 
The analytic distinction between legislative and nonlegislative rules, how-
ever, is notoriously “hazy.”
261
 Generally speaking, legislative rules are those rules 
that are legally binding on the agency, courts, and the public.
262
 They are re-
quired to go through notice-and-comment.
263
 Nonlegislative rules, by contrast, 
 
257. Bulk Data, OFF. FED. REG. (Dec. 29, 2018), https://www.federalregister.gov/reader-aids 
/developer-resources/bulk-data [https://perma.cc/5Q8D-2M8F]. 
258. According to the National Archives, each Federal Register issue is organized into four catego-
ries: (1) “Presidential Documents, including Executive orders and proclamations”; (2) “Rules 
and Regulations, including policy statements and interpretations of rules”; (3) “Proposed 
Rules, including petitions for rulemaking and other advance proposals”; and (4) “Notices, 
including scheduled hearings and meetings open to the public, grant applications, and ad-





261. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (describing the “spectrum” 
between interpretive and legislative rules as a “hazy continuum”); Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 
349, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
262. See David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 
YALE L.J. 276, 278 (2010). 
263. See Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, “Legislative” Rules and “Spurious” Rules: Lifting the 
Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 2-3 (1994). 
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merely clarify rather than create new obligations; they are exempt from notice-
and-comment.
264
 Sorting between these two categories is difficult in practice, as 
evidenced by the many muddled tests used by lower courts.
265
 Knowing that 
individually scrutinizing thousands of rules would be unworkable in practice, we 
searched for a simple sorting mechanism that could be operationalized. We ob-
served that the D.C. Circuit looks to whether an agency has published a rule in 
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) as a “snippet” of evidence that the rule 
is legislative in character.
266
 
While acknowledging that CFR publication is just one factor of many,
267
 we 
adopted a two-step procedure using the simple criterion. First, under the Office 
of the Federal Register’s Document Drafting Handbook, proposed and final 
rules that modify the CFR must contain “words of issuance.”
268
 In the case of 
proposed rules, these words represent an “expression that connects the preamble 
to the regulatory text and the tie between the proposed rule and the CFR units 
you propose to change.”
269
 This is a helpful textual cue, as most nonlegislative 
actions do not affect the CFR and therefore would not contain words of issuance. 
By contrast, virtually all legislative rules would affect the CFR and therefore 
would contain words of issuance. 
The words of issuance, the Handbook continues, are “always in the present 
tense and use the word ‘propose’ or ‘proposes.’”
270
 The Handbook also advises 
that other relevant verbs to include in the words of issuance are “amend,” “add,” 
“revise,” and “remove.” Examples include: “For the reasons discussed in the pre-
amble, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to amend 10 CFR part 430 
 
264. Nonlegislative rules are often also referred to as “guidance documents.” See, e.g., Nina A. Men-
delson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 399 
(2007) (“Guidance documents can closely resemble legislative rules, leading some to call them 
‘nonlegislative rules.’”). 
265. See Franklin, supra note 262, at 286-89 (summarizing various approaches and observing how 
“difficult” they often are to apply in practice). 
266. See Health Ins. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that 
CFR publication is no more than “a snippet of evidence of agency intent”). 
267. The D.C. Circuit has identified various objective indicia of a legislative rule: (1) CFR publica-
tion; (2) an adequate legislative basis for the agency action without the rule; (3) explicit in-
vocation of general legislative authority; or (4) an effective amendment to a previous legisla-
tive rule. See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993). 
268. Office of the Fed. Register, Document Drafting Handbook: August 2018 Edition, NAT’L ARCHIVES 
& RECORDS ADMIN. 2-2 (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register
/write/handbook/ddh.pdf [https://perma.cc/RN9Z-7HMS]. 




as follows” and “For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal Commu-
nications Commission proposes to revise 47 CFR part 430 to read as follows.”
271
 
We detect these words of issuances using a regular expression that searches for 
some variant of “propose” near one of those verbs, followed by a reference to the 
CFR or Code of Federal Regulations. As a first screen, we then remove those 
entries in the Proposed Rules section of the Federal Register that do not contain 
words of issuance. We apply the same basic methodology drawn from the Hand-
book to the Rules and Regulations section to attempt to isolate final rules. In this 
manner, the words-of-issuance screen likely removed most entries not related to 
legislative rulemakings. That said, some nonlegislative rules like rules of agency 
procedure can still affect the CFR. We therefore required a secondary screen to 
remove such procedural rules. This screen examined the rulemaking titles to re-
move rules with titles that refer to “procedure” or otherwise contain the term, 
“procedural.” 
All in all, this two-step procedure removes a substantial number of entries in 
the Federal Register. The original, unscreened dataset contained roughly 43,500 
entries in the Proposed Rule section and 68,000 entries in the Rules and Regu-
lations section. The words of issuance screen removed over 24,000 entries from 
the Proposed Rule section and about 25,500 entries from the Rules and Regula-
tions section. The procedural rule screen, in turn, removed a further 400 entries 
from the Proposed Rule section and about 1,700 entries from the Rules and Reg-
ulation section. As a check on these screening procedures, we then tasked a re-
search assistant with reviewing a random sample of entries (n = 130). We asked 
her to assess independently whether each entry represented a legislative rule. Ac-
cording to the research assistant’s coding, ninety-six percent of the rules in the 
sample were legislative in nature.
272
 Our own review suggests that the propor-
tion of legislative rules may be slightly higher due to reasonable disagreements 
about particular cases (such as those involving technical amendments). This ex-
ercise supports the basic efficacy of our screening protocol. 
D. Redundancy-Adjusted Measure 
Under the Office of Federal Register’s Thesaurus of Indexing Terms, many 
of the subjects exist in a hierarchical relationship to other subjects, with more 
precise terms falling under more general terms.
273
 For instance, “air taxis” is a 
 
271. Id. at 2-17. 
272. The ninety-five-percent confidence interval on this sample proportion is (.92, .99). 
273. See Office of the Fed. Register, Federal Register Thesaurus of Indexing Terms, NAT’L ARCHIVES & 
RECORDS ADMIN. (Dec. 29, 2018), https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/cfr 
/thesaurus.pdf [https://perma.cc/TTK5-DGJY]. 
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specific example of “air transportation,” and both terms exist as permissible en-
tries in the thesaurus that agencies might list in their rules. When agencies list 
both terms, the number of listed subjects may be greater than the number of true 
subjects in a meaningful way. Some of the listed subjects, that is, are redundant: 
adding a broader term to a more specific term does not increase the number of 
subjects addressed in a rulemaking effort. To account for this possibility, we wish 
to develop a redundancy-adjusted measure of the number of subjects. 
There are various ways that one might address this problem. A standard 
technique in natural-language processing involves reducing the dimensionality 
of the word-space by using, for instance, singular value decomposition or topic 
modelling. Likewise, scholars often attempt to reduce a large set of variables to 
a smaller set of factors using principal components analysis or similar tech-
niques. Doing so facilitates subsequent statistical analysis and may make the data 
more interpretable. Finally, in financial analysis, many measures of portfolio di-
versification exist, all of which provide some sense of how much “overlap” there 
is in a portfolio, a question not far from the present interest. 
All of these techniques have downsides. For example, generally one must se-
lect the number of factors or topics to model when reducing the dimensionality 
of the data. Algorithms and rules of thumb exist to help select the number of 
factors, but it is impossible to escape a degree of arbitrariness. More importantly, 
introducing a reduced-dimensionality representation of the data can in fact im-
pede intuition and interpretation—it is often not clear to what the various factors 
or topics produced by these techniques refer. Nor is it obvious how to produce 
from these reduced-dimensionality representations an intuitive sense of how 
“many” subjects to which a given rule relates. Most importantly, these tech-
niques do not take advantage of the structure known to exist in the data: the 
thesaurus tells us about the relationship between more specific and more general 
terms. 
To adjust the number of subjects, we thus adopt a simple algorithm that ex-
ploits the fact that the thesaurus informs us of the semantic structure of the 




See also  Air carriers 
     Air rates and fares 
Air taxis 











Military air transportation 
Navigation (air) 
The thesaurus uses “see also” to “[r]eference [the] user to narrower and re-
lated terms.”
275
 This structure tells us that “air taxis” is a more specific term un-
der the heading of “air transportation.” Using this structure, we first convert the 
thesaurus into a database in which each listed “general” term is associated with 
any relevant more “specific” term. Second, we examine each listed subject for 
each rule, probe whether it is a general term, and if so, determine whether any 
of the specific terms listed by the agency appear as separate entries for that rule. 
If that is the case, then we depreciate the general term from the count of the 
number of subjects for that rule. If not, we retain the general term, as no more 
specific substitute exists in the list of subjects for that rule. To take an example, 
if the rule listed “air taxis” and “air transportation,” our simple algorithm would 
produce a count of one, as we effectively remove “air transportation” from the 
list of subjects. At the same time, if it listed only “air taxis” or only “air transpor-
tation,” the count would likewise be one. 
It turns out that agencies commonly list both more general and more specific 
terms, but that it does not affect the qualitative features of the data. For instance, 
nearly sixty percent (roughly 66,500) of the final or proposed rules in the dataset 
require the depreciation of at least one general term. However, the adjusted and 
unadjusted measures correlated strongly, r = 0.96. As robustness exercises, we 
reestimated the empirical analyses presented in the body of this Article. Qualita-
tively, the results tend to remain stable under the adjusted measure.
276
 
E. Alternative Measures 
In the interest of transparency and to give a sense of how other possible 
measures of bundling map on to this inquiry, consider the following replications 
of Figures 1 and 4 and Table 1 from the Article. 
 
275. Office of the Fed. Register, History of the Thesaurus of Indexing Terms and the CFR Index 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
276. See Nou & Stiglitz, supra note 176. The one result that does seem to change under this adjusted 
measure relates to bundling during the midnight period: we find somewhat less bundling in 
the midnight period with the adjusted measure.  
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The top panel of Figure A1 plots the trends over time in bundling as meas-
ured with the (log) number of words in the rulemaking document (i.e., includ-
ing the rule or proposed rules, as well as any preamble material). There, one sees 
that the trends in the (log) number of words qualitatively tracks that presented 
in Figure 1: broadly, an increase over time in bundling activity. Moreover, one 
likewise sees the dip in bundling in 2017 with this measure. The bottom panel of 
the Figure presents the corresponding results when bundling is measured with 
the (log) number of sections referred to in the rule.
277
 The patterns for this 
measure seem roughly to follow those reported in the Article, though the trend 
is fainter and noisier. One continues to see, though, the dip in bundling in 2017. 
  
 
277. We add one to the number of sections so as to avoid logging a zero; we record zero sections 




REPLICATION OF FIGURE 1 
 
Table A1 replicates Table 1 from the Article using the alternative measures. 
While some of the results are similar, there are also some meaningful differ-
ences—particularly regarding executive versus independent agencies—that are 
worthy of further exploration.   





Finally, Figure A2 replicates Figure 4 from the main body of the text, again 
now using the alternative measures. There we see that, as with the preferred 
measure, these measures modestly exhibit right-skew, even after log transfor-
mations. The bottom panel, which displays the pattern for the number of sec-
tions, also suggests the coarseness of this measure. That coarseness may explain 
why it is challenging to replicate the main results using this particular alternative 
measure. 
FIGURE A2. 
REPLICATION OF FIGURE 4 
 
 
 
